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Under pressure of more intensive and diverse uses, the
legal principle of "Freedom of Access" to marine resources
is no longer sufficient to regulate man's activities in the
marine environment. An analysis of the factors which must
be considered in designing a workable regime for the future
exploitation of the ocean was conducted. Oceanographic as
well as political and economic factors are examined, and
alternative solutions evaluated as to their ability to
satisfy various interests and objective considerations. A
recommended formula for the delimitation of coastal state
jurisdiction in ocean space and a proposed structure for an
International oceajn Authority to regulate dtuivitico iu Lh«
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I . INTRODUCTION
When the uses and users of the sea and its resources
were few, "Freedom of Access" was a workable legal principle
to regulate man's activities in hydrospace. Assumed abun-
dance made restricted access unnecessary. Under pressures
of advancing technology and burgeoning population, govern-
ments are increasingly aware of the potential wealth and
scarcity of marine resources. The concept of "Freedom of
Access" is rapidly breaking down. As the uses of hydrospace
become more diverse and intense, marine resources are ac-
quiring an economic value making them subjects of conservation,
protection and expropriation by individual states [Ref. 1]
.
Witnm one yt^cw , Ccuinuci udb coLaijxj.onc>j a GliC ivjiicrcc:
mile pollution control zone off her Arctic shores [Ref. 2]
and Brazil has claimed sovereignty over a two-hundred mile
territorial sea. - One may argue that Canada demonstrated
insufficient regard for international community action to
control pollution, or that she acted rightly to preserve the
delicate ecology of the Arctic wastes. Whether noble or self-
serving, such unilateral claims by nation-states may sooner
Reference 3 reported Brazil joining Argentina, Chile, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Panama, Peru, Nicaragua and Uruguay, in claiming
a 200-mile territorial sea. Brazilian sources were quoted
as stating: "...ships will be able to fish only under special
licenses to be negotiated with the Brazilian government
But no foreign fishing at all will be permitted in the inner





or later become customary international law unless actively
challenged. Historically, such actions have lead to parallel
or even more extensive claims by other states. The Truman
Proclamation of 1945 [Ref . 4] , which asserted the claim of
the United States to the resources of its continental shelf,
lead to a host of other's claims not only to shelf resources,
but to sovereignty ever the shelf itself and, in some cases,
2the superadjacent waters.
All too often, international law must react to problems
which its formulators failed to anticipate
. The 1958 Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, called to provide a stable
framework for man's development of marine resources, virtu-
ally assured increased tensions by its failure to fix the
K^oa ^+-h of the territorial sea and by the use of a flexible
boundary condition in defining the legal continental shelf.
2Reference 5 alleges that the Truman Proclamation was moti-
vated by a desire on the part of the United States decision
makers "...to provide the legal underpinnings for regulation
of the petroleum industry. Such regulatory authority may
well have been demanded by the industry in order to guarantee
security of investment and in order to secure favorable tax
treatment." Reference 5 further asserts that "the Proclam-
ation was carefully circumscribed so as not to give any
country a basis for claiming more rights in areas adjacent
to their coasts than the United States had claimed in the
area adjacent to its coasts." The proliferation of uni-
lateral claims following the Proclamation, and the tendency
for states to convert "special purpose" claims to "general
purpose" claims are also discussed in Refs. 5, 6, 7 and 8.
3
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf [Ref. 9] , in
Article 1, defines "Continental Shelf" as referring "to the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine area adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation
of the natural resources of the said areas."

Thus, unilateral claims and broad, self-serving inter-
pretations of existing law proliferate, as states continue
4
efforts to reserve marine resources to their exclusive use.
Often such "land grabs" do not even meet the test of economics,
the claimant frequently being incapable of the most effici-
5
ent production.
Poor law may be worse than no law at all. Rather than
limit national encroachment on ocean space, the 1958 Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, with its vague concepts of
"adjacency" and "exploitability" , is being used to justify
c.
national encroachments. Judicial law established by the
4Two cases in point. Reference 6 mentions the capture by Peru,
which claims a 200-mile territorial sea, of a whaling fleet
owned by Aristotle Onassis. A $3,000,000 fine was collected,
"...desoite protests bv the United Kingdom in which the ves-
sels \iCjic insured and by Panama where the^ i e?:~ registered
In this incident two of the vessels were captured 126 miles
offshore and the others were taken after escaping beyond the
200-mile limit, the doctrine of hot pursuit even having been
successfully applied." The same reference discusses the Sea
of Okhotsk, where "...in actual practice de fact o sovereignty
over this sea as internal waters of the Soviet: Unicn appears
to have been successfully established. Fishing therein by
foreign nationals e.g., by the Japanese, is controlled by the
Soviet Union via the requirement of Soviet endorsement of
Japanese Government fishing licenses."
5Reference 10 makes the analogy: "In the Cherokee Strip, the
rewards went to owners of the fastest horses, not the best
farmers. The losers are not only those who might be best
equipped to exploit the resources, but also society in that
less productive units of capital and labor may be employed."
References 11 and 12 examine the concept of "exploitability"
as it pertains to expanding national jurisdiction over sea-
bed resources. Reference 11 points out: "There are those
who argue that any coastal state may assert sovereign rights
to 'continental shelf areas beyond the two hundred metre
bathymetric contour line if the resources of the zone claimed
could be exploited by the application of the skills at the
disposal of the world's most advanced state."
10

decision of the International Court of Justice on the
"North Sea Continental Shelf Case" has an ability to com-
7pound problems.
Some maintain that ocean space, supposedly lacking
vested interests, offers fertile ground for the establish-
ment of an idealistic "Republic of the Deep Seas"; they are
deluding themselves [Ref. 18]. No political or legal
vacuum presently exists; present law is already being used
to extend national jurisdiction over wider areas. Fisher-
men, mariners, and Naval officers have long been sustained
by the sea, and will likely each constitute an interest for
a considerable time.
Besides the traditional users of the sea, new and
powerful interests are emerqinq as a consequence of the
7
References 13, 14 and 15 discuss the decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice relative to the division of the
sea-bed resources of the North Sea (Fig. 1) . The Court
declared: "...the rights of the coastal State in respect
of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under
the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its
sovereignty over the land , and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
the sea-bed and exploiting its natural resources. In short,
there is here an inherent right. " (Quoted in Ref. 10 from
I. C. J. Reports, 3, 1969, p. 22.) This reference to the
"natural prolongation of its land territory" has been used
to justify claims to the sea-bed resources of the entire
continental margin ! [Refs. 16, 17].
p
Reference 19 reports that the U a S. Department of the
Interior has concluded: "...that the Secretary's leasing
power under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, read in
light of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, extends
to an area lying about 40 miles off California in water
depths ranging up to 4,020 feet (1,225 meters) with the
greater part being in excess of 600 feet (183 meters)."
11

unrelenting advance of technology. As of 1968, the invest-
ment of United States oil companies in offshore petroleum
and gas operations amounted to $12.9 billion. The same
year, 14% of this nation's crude oil and condensate production
came from the offshore [Ref. 20]. The history and projected
development of offshore petroleum activities are presented in
Figures 2 and 3.
The exploitation of sea-bed minerals other than petroleum
is rapidly expanding. References 21-24 examine the broad
spectrum of these activities and their potential for future
development. Perhaps the most exciting recent advances are
those dealing with the possible exploitation of deep-sea
manganese nodules, a resource whose development was thougnt
fn h(=> far in the future, Dsensea Ventures, a snbsidiarv of
Tenneco Corporation, has recently announced a target date of
1975-76 for commercial operations in this field [Ref. 25]
.
Coincident with technological advances and the prospect
of increased wealth from the seas have come even greater
political and social pressures. Freedom of access to marine
resources does not insure an ability to share in the wealth
[Ref. 1] . Lack of technological expertise and inability to
command huge sums of capital effectively preclude participa-
tion of developing countries in marine resource exploitation.
In addition, accidents of geography constitute a "natural"
discrimination. Some states are land-locked, while not all
coastal states are equally blessed with wide continental
shelves. If we accept the principle of "res communes" as
12

pertaining to the resources of the seas, then, of necessity,
international law in this area must be tempered with equity .
The developing nations demand it! The land-locked and shelf-
limited nations demand it!
The Maltese initiative of 1967, respecting the sea-bed,
is a dramatic example of this drive toward equity in the
9
"Law of the Sea." After widespread debate and exhaustive
study by the United Nations, individual governments and
private groups: [Ref. 27]
"...the common heritage has been acknowledged,
but the lawyers cannot agree about the
property rights."
Unless some form of equitable international agreement is
soon reached, it appears obvious that individual states,
^cnprini iv fhp rli RarlvHntsaed states, will assert claims
unilaterally to what they consider their fair share of the
"common heritage of mankind." The consequences of such a
lack of world order could be disasterous for man's future
(Fig. 4).
The international community is presently engaged in
planning for a comprehensive Law of the Sea Conference to
On 17 August 1967, Malta proposed to the United Nations
General Assembly: "the reservation exclusively for peace-
ful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the use
of their resources in the interests of mankind." Subsequently
introducing the proposal before the First Committee of the
General Assembly, the Government of Malta further proposed:
"a resolution stating that the sea-bed and ocean floor were
a common heritage of mankind and should be used for peaceful
purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole, that the
needs of poor countries should receive preferential treat-
ment from any financial benefits accruing and that claims to
sovereignty over the area should be frozen until a clear




be held in 1973. In this regard, it is unfortunate that
Malta's initiative was directed at the "sea-bed and the
ocean floor" [Ref . 26] . Although it aroused tremendous
interest among policy makers in the future of the world
ocean, it tended to focus attention on the sea-bed alone.
With the exception of the independent proposal of Elizabeth
Mann Borgese [Refs. 28, 29], virtually all planning to date
has been directed at regimes for the exploitation of the
sea-bed and its subsoil.
Obviously, the sea-bed interacts physically as well as
politically with the overlying hydrosphere, and the com-
plexities of these interactions can be both far-reaching
and intense. An operator mining or drilling the bottom
would be understandablv interested in some measure of con-
trol over activities taking place "over his head." At the
same time, who is to decide whether or not to proceed with
the development of a valuable petroleum deposit which just
happens to lie in the area of a valuable mid-water fishery
(Figs. 5 and 6)? Any oceanographer knows that the oceans
constitute a system , with complex and poorly understood
mechanisms governing interactions both within the medium
and at the boundaries. As such, it must be treated as a
system . "Solutions" imposed at one point can have drastic
and far-reaching effects unless the dynamics of the whole
are considered.
The nature of the marine environment must be taken into
account if a truly viable regime for the oceans is to be
14

forthcoming. For centuries the oceans have served as the
ultimate sewer of the earth, yet only recently has man come
to realize the dangerous economic and social consequences
of indiscriminate pollution. The solubility and diffusivity
of many materials are virtually unknown in sea water
,
yet
dumping continues at a constantly increasing rate. The
results have often deen dramatic. Reference 30 gives many
vivid examples of this progressive deterioration.
In this regard, the potential effects of large scale
mining operations on the marine environment are unknown.
The necessity of preventing, controlling, and alleviating
the effects of possible pollution provide incentives for
close regulation of future drilling or mining activities.
^« ar.innmi p and r.ocial costs of damage by new industries
must not be passed on to other users of ocean space.
Thus, by the nature of the requirement, any regime to be
imposed on the marine environment must reasonably satisfy
the political and economic aspirations of both developed and
developing countries, as well as conform to ocean environ-
mental realities. Only in such a way can the development
of marine resources serve the best interests of mankind.
It is well known that heavy siltation is lethal to some
marine species. In addition, it can be assumed that a
high degree of turbidity would reduce photosynthetic
activity in the surface layers, with possible widespread
consequences to both earth's oxygen supply and the food
productivity of the oceans. Studies into the turbidity
produced by various mining methods and the tolerance of
marine life to silt have just begun under the auspices




An analysis of these factors was undertaken with a view
toward determining what system of administration/control
over marine activities would best satisfy the requirement
for rational development. Details of this analysis are
presented in the following sections.
16

I I . THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
The seas are of vital importance to the United States.
Perhaps no other state is so deeply involved in the entire
spectrum of ocean activities. Both the security and the
economic well-being of the nation depend on forthcoming
developments in the "Law of the Sea." On one particular
question, the proper limit of coastal state jurisdiction
over ocean areas, various domestic groups have widely
divergent interests. These must be carefully evaluated if
the balance essential to an optimal policy is to be found.
The analysis which follows profitted from the work of
Ratner [Ref. 5], and also reflects information obtained
from other sources, including personal correspondence.
Specific positions espoused by various individuals and groups




The coastal fishing industry advocates' the
expansion of national jurisdiction seaward, the object being
the exclusion of foreign competition. Johnson [Ref. 38]
estimates that U. S. fishermen are currently harvesting only
10% of the maximum sustainable yield off our coasts, while
the take by foreign fishing fleets is only slightly higher.
A multiplicity of factors, including the inefficiency
17

inherent in the fragmented nature of the American fishing
industry, make it doubtful that an extension of national
jurisdiction would improve the capabilities of our fisher-
men [Ref. 38]. It is conceivable that foreign competition,
operating under proper controls, may actually result in
greater benefits to more people from this resource.
b. Distant
The distant-water fishing industry (tuna, shrimp,
etc.) advocates narrow limits of national jurisdiction. It
roams widely off foreign coasts, and seeks the widest
possible freedom to fish. Its activities have brought it
into direct confrontation with those nations claiming wide
limits of fishery jurisdiction, resulting in seizures, fines,
<--j..J irit^rnationsl -^^t->'-, -; q^ Ac > *-> the previous case, if the
coastal fishermen of a state are not harvesting the maximum
sustainable yield, there is no biological reason why the




The United States has been blessed with long
coasts and continental margins approximating eight percent
of the world total. Because of depth and geology, these
areas hold great promise of petroleum production in the
foreseeable future. Both the National Petroleum Council
and the American Petroleum Institute advocate the expansion
of national jurisdiction over the entire continental margin
18

[Refs. 16, 19 and 39]. By so doing, they apparently reject
the argument that an international regime would provide more
security of investment for wor Id-wide operations. Put
succinctly [Ref . 16]
:
"The National Petroleum Council feels that it has
a continuing responsibility to emphasize, as it
has from time to time in the past , that adequate
petroleum resources are of major consequence to
the economy and the security (in its broadest
sense) of this Nation. ...The oil and gas
resources in these submerged portions of our
continent may well prove to be larger than
those remaining on the land. These strategic
and valuable resources could well be the means
of maintaining far into the future this Nation's
essential self-sufficiency and avoiding the
vulnerability inherent in dependence on foreign
energy sources."
Strong support for this position was evidenced by members of
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs [Refs.
17 , 35 ] .
In the interest of objectivity, one should note
that what is good, in this case, for the United States is
also good for domestic oil companies. An international
regime would presumably establish uniform fees and regu-
lations for marine petroleum development throughout its
area of responsibility. As long as the oil companies are
free to negotiate with individual countries, the possibility
of obtaining more advantageous terms with one or another
exists. In addition, there would be little incentive for
the government to extend favorable tax treatment to off-
shore production beyond the limits of United States juris-




Those individuals and groups concerned with the
exploitation of minerals, other than petroleum, favor an
ocean regime which will [Ref . 40]
:
"...assure freedom of development in the deep
ocean and security of tenure to those engaged
in mining on and under the ocean floor."
These same interests, however, oppose an organization which
is "unnecessarily elaborate" on the ground that such a
system would discourage development of marine minerals
[Ref. 40]. From such information as is available, it appears
that an International Claims Registry with limited regulatory
function would be the authority most acceptable to these
interests. Under such a system the preponderance of admin-
i strative and reaulatorv functions would remain under national
jurisdiction [Refs. 40, 41].
3. Merchant Shipping
Commercial shipping interests advocate narrow limits
of coastal state jurisdiction, the object being maximum
mobility for the conduct of international trade. Although
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone [Ref. 42] guarantees the "Right of Innocent Passage" by
merchant ships through the territorial sea of foreign states,
widespread enforcement of "Pollution Control Zones" and
other restrictions imposed by coastal states would seriously




The United States is a world leader in oceanographic
research. In the conduct of scientific research off foreign
coasts, vessels often become subject to the arbitrary regu-
lations of other states [Refs. 11, 12]. In general, the
scientific community advocates absolute freedom to conduct
research beyond narrow limits of national jurisdiction.
However, freedom to conduct research does not preclude
international coordination of research activities. Efforts
in this area will be discussed in later sections.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Pollution caused by foreign vessels can have drastic
effect on coastal fishing and recreation areas. Many
officials ana groups aavocate expanded udi Loiia! iuiitsuiction
over the waters off our shores as a means of providing
greater protection for the coastal environment. They reject
the argument that the proliferation of conflicting rules and
regulations could cripple world trade, and maintain that the




In the coastal regions of the United States there
are many military installations of a highly classified and
strategic nature. To prevent foreign intelligence gathering
and possible sabotage, as well as provide defense against
21

submarine .launched cruise missiles, there are those who
advocate expanded national jurisdiction off our coasts.
In this age of ballistic missiles, however, it is doubtful
whether such a move would appreciably enhance our security.
2. Military Strategy
As a major power with extensive overseas commitments,
the United States must be able to project its military might
to remote corners of the world. In order to maximize the
effectiveness of our air and Naval forces, military strategy
requires maximum mobility. Figure 4 shows the global effect
of a general 200-mile territorial sea. The extension of
coastal state sovereignty to only 12 miles would place 116
presently international straits under national jurisdiction
foa-F A 3 i Such actions would close larae oortions of air
and ocean space to our forces. For this reason, military
security of the United States requires the narrowest
possible limits on coastal state jurisdiction, and guarantees
of free air and sea passage over and through international
straits.
3. Foreign Affair s
The United States budget for 197 2 authorized
$4,085,625,000 for foreign assistance programs [Ref. 44],
According to the "Nixon Doctrine" , United States foreign
policy for the 1970 's calls for a reduction of American
presence overseas, with more emphasis on [Ref. 45] :
"local and regional initiatives, ...national
independence and self-sufficiency."
To reduce its presence overseas and yet maintain its
22

commitment to other nations, the United States will be
forced to place even greater emphasis on seapowor. A
reduced presence would also be served by the establishment
of an independent source of international development funds.
American foreign policy interests, therefore, would benefit
from narrow limits being kept on the national jurisdiction
of states over ocean space, and by the international com-
munity having an "independent" source of income through
royalties on marine resource development.
E. FORMULATION OF "AMERICAN" INTERESTS
Figure 7 summarizes varied United States interests on
the question of narrow versus wide limits of national juris-
diction. It must be emphasized that these interests rep-
resent the preferences ot internal pressure groups. Aithougn
even the smallest group may be quite vocal and attract con-
siderable support, it is the interaction between interests
which determines overall government policy.
Analyzed in this way, the seeming balance between particu-
lar interests rapidly changes perspective. The desire of the
coastal fishing industry for expanded national jurisdiction
11
clashes with the interests of our distant-water fishermen.
The United States, in 1966, extended its zone of exclusive
fisheries jurisdiction to a distance of 12 miles from the
base-line used to measure the territorial sea [Ref . 49] .
This constituted an extension of nine miles over previously
claimed limits, and brought the United States into conformity
with widespread international practice (Table 1) . A further
extension by the United States, however, would seriously
jeopardize the position of our distant-water fishermen.
23

Likewise, the preferences of domestic environmentalists
conflict with those of our merchant marine. Measures to
increase our frontier security through expanded control ever
activities off our shores would run counter to cur strategic
(or political/military) concepts, the views of our foreign
and military services and the wishes of our scientific
community
o
Given the principle of reciprocity in international
relations, we cannot hope to restrain other nations from
imposing the same degree of regulation that we ourselves
impose. Thus, it has become United States policy to support
international solutions to fishery and pollution problems
beyond narrow limits of national jurisdiction [Refs. 46-48]
.
p, i v- 4- k .=>>- cffr.rf c; +- q rnmnmmifip are aonarent in the willingness
of the United States to accept an extension of the territorial
sea to 12 miles, if coupled with suitable guarantees of free
passage through and over international straits [Ref . 48]
.
The balance of United States interests leans heavily in
favor of limited national jurisdiction in ocean space.
The problem, however, is not so simple that the interests
of the minerals industries can be disregarded. The economic
well being and security of the nation do require the main-
tenance of a sound energy base and continued development of
new industry. Viable government policy requires conflicting
interests be resolved, not ignored.
In an effort to meet this dilemma, policy makers have
chosen to treat the problem piecemeal. The United States
24

draft "Convention on the International Seabed Area," sub-
mitted to the United Nations on 3 August 1970, would
establish as "International Seabed Area" that portion of
the ocean floor seaward of the 200-meter contour or 12 mile
limit (whichever is farther seaward) [Ref. 50]. That portion
of the "International Seabed Area" lying between the landward
boundary and the base of the continental slope, however,
would constitute an "International Trusteeship Area," in
which the coastal state would exercise effective, if not
de facto
,
jurisdiction over sea-bed activities. Article 6
of the draft further proposes:
"Neither this Convention nor any rights granted
or exercised pursuant thereto shall affect the
lpnsl status of the suoeriacent waters as hicrh
aoao, ui t-iiai. ou_ i_ne c^. j_ x. space •^.j-s^jjc, x-±iz>*i-c
waters.
"
In this manner, the United States seeks to resolve its
conflicting interests with regard to the question of limits
of national jurisdiction over ocean areas. The national
and international acceptability of such solutions depends
on other considerations examined in subsequent sections.
25

III. THE INTERESTS OF OTHER NATIONS
Detailed analyses of the interests of each of some 140
states eligible to attend the 1973 Conference on the Lav; of
the Sea is a monumental task now underway within the United
States government. What is attempted here is the identifi-
cation of groups of states which share like interests
because of similar circumstances. The following summaries
are based on the statements of national representatives
before the United Nations and other noted references,
particularly Ref. 5.
A. SOME GEOGRAPHICAL DETERMINANTS
l T.^nrl-T.ncked and Shelf-Limited States
1 2
The land-locked and shelf-limited x countries,
numbering over 50, will constitute the largest bloc at the
1973 conference (Table II). Since their share in the
wealth of the seas is presently limited, they will presum-
ably seek to limit national jurisdiction and obtain a more
equitable share through an international authority over
sea-bed resources. The statement of the Delegate of
Singapore (a shelf-locked state) to the United Nations Sea-
Bed Committee on 17 March 1971, is typical of the position
taken by this group. He stated [Ref. 51] :
12Shelf-locked refers to states without immediate access to
continental shelf areas. Kuwait and Singapore are examples
Shelf-limited as used here includes those states whose
coasts are of minimal extent.
26

"...we, the representatives of shelf-locked and
land-locked states, cannot afford to be indif-
ferent to the escalating claims by some
coastal states to the sea-bed and ocean floor
for every such extension of national juris-
diction constitutes an encroachment upon, and
a diminution of, the value of our future
inheritance.
"
2. States Having Coasts and Continental Margins of
Moderate Size
Forty-one states in this geographical category may
choose to go either way on the question of limits to national
jurisdiction. The developing countries, especially, are
stressing that determination of the type of regime to be
established for the exploitation of sea-bed resources must
preceed decision on limits to national jurisdiction [Ref.
52] . If they calculate that the benefits from such an
from exploitation off their own shores, they will opt for
narrow national jurisdiction. If not, they may be expected
to advocate wide national limits.
3
.
States with Long Coasts but Little or No Continental
Margins
This group of three states has traditionally favored
wide zones of national jurisdiction, the object being exclu-
sive control over fisheries. Peru, for example, leads the
world in fishing activity. In 1969, her fishing industry
accounted for approximately 15% of the total world catch,
while her exports of various fish commodities amounted to
$220.5 million [F.ef - 53]. In order to protect this valuable
resource, Peru claims a 200-mile territorial sea, subscribing
to the principle that coastal states have [Ref. 54] :
27

"the right to establish the limits of their
maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction in
accordance with their geographical and geo-
logical characteristics and with the factors
governing the existence of marine resources
and the need for their rational utilization.
"
4. States with Long Coasts and Substantial Continental
Margins
Twenty-two states in this category are caught on the
horns of. a dilemma. The developed countries, like the United
States, must weigh all their domestic and foreign policy
interests to determine what course to pursue. The develop-
ing countries must decide whether the benefits to be derived
from narrow limits of national jurisdiction and an inter-
national regime for the exploitation of sea-bed resources
outweigh those to be gained by national licensing of
cvninifiup activity in an exoanded offshore zone. Just as
the developing states in Group 2, these under-developed
nations want to keep their options open by insisting that
an international regime must be decided upon before they
commit themselves on the question of national limits [Ref.
55] .
Brazil, the United States, and Canada are states
whose positions have apparently crystalized on this issue.
Brazil has elected to extend its national jurisdiction,
adhering to the Montevideo Declaration of 1970 [Ref. 3, 54,
56] . The United States seeks to limit national jurisdiction
in ocean space as much as possible [Ref. 48] . The position




5 . States Bordering on "Internal Seas"
Approximately 22 nations border on land-locked or
partially land-locked seas. A number of these states have
expressed interest in regional solutions similar to that
reached concerning the North Sea. They feel that "internal
seas" should be left to the development of the bordering
states. Italy, for example, having a critical interest in
the future of the Adriatic, has asserted [Ref. 58]
:
"...it seems natural that such countries should
be inclined to arrive at agreed arrangements
among themselves concerning the exploration
and exploitation of mineral resources."
6. Archipelagic States
Two states, having land territory made up of a group
of islands, adhere to the "Archipelago Theory" of national
boundary delimitation. under this concept, all water ccn
tained within a baseline connecting the outermost points of
the outermost islands would constitute internal waters of
the state. In the case of Indonesia, this would amount to
over three million square miles of territory, approximately
700,000 square miles being land [Ref. 7]. The Philippines
also adhere to this theory. Because many important sea lanes
pass through these areas, their denial as "High Seas" would
have a detrimental effect on international maritime activity.
B. SOME POLITICAL/ECONOiMIC PREDILECTIONS
1. Perceived Stages of Development
In so far as they exist, the interests of various
internal pressure groups within individual nations would,
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13for the most part, coincide with those in the United States.
Because of varying degrees of economic development, however,
not all interests represented in the United States are extant
in other nations. The result is widely divergent national
attitudes toward the preferred outcome respecting the Law of
the Sea. Seen in this light, it is logical for Peru (whose
economy is heavily dependent on the coastal fishing industry
and whose distant fishing., naval, merchant marine and
research interests are minimal) to assert her national
interest by exclusive control over fishing off her coast.
Inspired by the success of Peru, many other develop-
ing countries are seeking to build domestic fishing indus-
tries and, thereby, provide desperately needed protein to
their throwing copulations as wel] as obtain foreign exchange.
In most cases, the lack of capital and technological exper-
tise preclude the developing state from any other form of
national participation in marine activities. This has con-
tributed to the pre-eminent concern for conserving fisheries,
13There are exceptions, of course. In Ref. 59, a representa-
tive of British Petroleum, Ltd. states: "Our view in the
oil company is that we go along with anything. It really
isn't our business to interfere too much. ...We have to
pay royalties to somebody; that is all right. We have to
pay it to an individual country, or to a local landowner,
or we pay it to this international body; but we must have
a good certainty that once we put our expensive money into
an operation we can continue doing it without interference
and without sudden stoppages." He further states that the
oil industry has three requirements of any regime: "security
of tenure" ; "guarantee that individual industries - indivi-
dual companies - be allowed to apply for and obtain





avoiding over-exploitation of the sea-bed and preventing
ocean pollution. References 55, 60, and 61 are indicative
of this concern.
The potential effects of environmental pollution
are no less a vital interest to a state whose economy is
largely dependent on tourism. Jamaica, for example, has
addressed this issue in the course of United Nations debate
on the forthcoming Lav; of the Sea Conference [Ref . 62] .
The economies of many developing countries are
heavily dependent on exporting mineral commodities to
developed states. The prospect of imminent production of
sea-bed minerals is causing widespread concern over the
possible adverse effect this would have on the prices of
T^u; msf^risl<; mirin.-l on land rRpf R (-•. £> 3
1
Bra.Z5.3 f rif
example, has proposed [Ref. 56] :
"Mechanisms should be devised to prevent
depressive effects on the prices of raw
materials as a result of the exploitation
of the sea-bed. A like safeguard should
be established to the effect that developed
countries must not discriminate in their
domestic legislation in favour of the
products of their national companies operating
in the international area of the sea-bed."
The positions taken by the developed countries
reflect their greater involvement in the wide range of ocean
based economic activities. Although the statements made by
their representatives in the course of United Nations debates
may differ in detail from those of the United States, they
reveal considerable agreement on substantive issues. They
generally seek compromise solutions to the broad range of
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ocean problems, recognizing the need to reconcile the inter-
ests of coastal and non-coastal , developing and developed
states [Ref. 57, 64-66].
Despite divergent national interests, several
modalities and principles are widely accepted. The Twenty-
Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly passed
a series of resolutions dealing with problems concerning the
Law of the Sea. Reference 67, called for a comprehensive
Law of the Sea Conference to be held in 1973. This Confer-
ence would deal with the entire range of ocean problems,
with a view toward updating existing law. To govern the
interim, a "Moritorium" resolution declares [Ref. 68]
:
"(a) States and persons, physical or juridical,
are bound to refrain from all activities
iji sxplc 2. tati.cn ~r the resources cj •*--. ^
area of the sea-bed ana ocean floor, and
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its
resources shall be recognized."
By these pronouncements, the international community has
sought to prevent further encroachment on the "common
heritage", while keeping all options open during ensuing
study and debate.
2. Attitudes Toward Management of Resources
The "Declaration of Principles" passed by the General
Assembly on 28 January 1971, lays down basic guidelines for
an ultimate regime "Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor,
and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Juris-
diction." [Ref. 69]. Although those concrete proposals
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submitted to the United Nations to date have dealt exclu-
sively with regimes for the exploitation of the sea-bed
[Ref. 50, 70-71], there is growing evidence that many nations
consider a more comprehensive approach is necessary. This
is apparent in the resolution calling for a comprehensive
Law of the Sea Conference, which was passed over the "No"
vote of several of the most developed countries (the United
States included).
While the United States has attempted to resolve
the conflict of interests in ocean space by divorcing the
sea-bed from the superadjacent waters, many states are
stressing the continuity of interest which extends from
surface to bottom [Ref. 55, 60, 63]. The Permanent Repre-
sentative of Malta to the United Nations. Ambassador Arvid
14Pardo, recently observed [Ref. 72] :
"The interests of the Coastal State in ocean
space, although varied, are now so inter-
locked that they should be considered as a
whole and a unified outer boundary of
national jurisdiction in ocean space should
be established."
Given this criterion, it is doubtful that the United States
would pursue its own trust area proposal if coastal states
were thereby likely to incorporate the superadjacent water
and air above the "International Trusteeship Area" [Ref.
50] .
14Ambassador Pardo delivered the original Maltese proposal
regarding the sea-bed to the United Nations in 1967.
Since that time he has attained a position of considerable
influence within the community of developing nations.
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The international machinery proposed by France for
a sea-bed regime is very limited in nature, its stated ob-
jective being the promotion of "economic efficiency" [Ref.
71]. The small and developing countries, however, generally
favor a strong international authority, with considerable
power to regulate and control exploitive activity. They
believe that such an authority would best protect their
interests and, with the proceeds, promote their development
[Refs. 56, 62, 65, 73]. There is already some desire for
an international authority empowered to conduct ocean re-
search , systems development and productive operations and
,
thereby, afford all nations the opportunity to participate
through the authority [Refs. 56, 73].
3. rT~ticii of National anri ^loV.ni Security Tntsrssts
Since the close of World War II, many states of the
"free world" have concluded multilateral and bilateral
security agreements designed to deter aggression and reduce
subversion. The effectiveness of NATO, ANZUS , and the
Japanese-American Defense Pact, to name a few such arrange-
ments, are directly dependent on the ability of the combined
naval and air forces to control the "High Seas" areas within
their respective zones. To accomplish this end, strategy
requires the maximum ability to maneuver and concentrate
forces. The more developed states of the "free world" have,
therefore, opposed efforts to extend the jurisdiction of
coastal states seaward.
The tremendous growth of the maritime interests of
the Soviet Bloc since 1945, has resulted in one of the
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strange paradoxes of the cold war. The development of a
far-ranging naval, fishing, oceanographic research and
merchant marine capability has made the Soviet Union, for
the first time in its history, a major maritime power.
Although the USSR still seeks to curry favor among the
developing states by verbal attacks on "colonialists" and
"imperialists", her new global interests and intended
domination over her satellites suggests her future opposition
to seaward expansion of coastal state jurisdiction.
Contrary to the global interests of the developed
nations, the developing states are primarily concerned with
their frontier security and continued existance. They view
foreign vessels (be they military, research or fishing
vgs°c1s) operating r^f-f -f-h^ .Ti^^t- as potential threats to
their security and economic well being. In addition, the
fear of being annihilated as innocent bystanders in a
nuclear exchange between superpowers is largely responsible
for the active part played by the smaller nations on the
Geneva Disarmament Committee [Ref . 74] . j It was this same
desire to prevent extension of the arms race that aroused
such widespread support among the developing nations for the
proposal that the sea-bed and ocean floor be reserved
15
"exclusively for peaceful purposes"
.
15 Supra, Note 9
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C. VARIANCE AND SIMILARITY OP' FOREIGN INTERESTS
Friedheim [Ref. 75] has provided an in-depth analysis
of the United Notions Conferences on the Law of the Sea held
in 1958 and I960, from the standpoint of the divergent
1 c:
positions assumed by "satisfied" and ''dissatisfied" states.
He points out that the "satisfied" tended to consider the
conferences as legal forums at which traditional law was to
be codified and the fine points debated. The "dissatisfied"
expressed general disaffection for existing concepts of
international law, and regarded the conferences as political
forums at which divergent political and economic interests
were to be reconciled by new law. Thus, while the "satis-
fied" were concerned with preserving the concept of "Freedom
s^Z Lhc Ccr.c" , the "dissatisfied" wpr« overwhelmingly pre-
occupied with :
1. the concept of Sovereignty, and especially the
desire to extend their Sovereignty over wide
territorial seas, continental shelves, and
fisheries zones;
2. a distrust for "experts" in various fields,
especially experts from "satisfied" states;
3. the demand that international law take their
interests and desires into account, and that
Although "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" in the context of
Ref. 75 refers to national attitudes toward the then
existing Law of the Sea, the states included in these
categories could, in general, also be described as
"developed" and "developing" , respectively.
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they share full participation in the formulation
of international law; and
4. a refusal to recognize, as binding on themselves,
international law created prior to their emergence
as independent states.
The situation is considerably more complex today than
it was in 1958. There appears to be general agreement that
existing law does not satisfy today's economic and technologi-
cal realities, and that divergent interests must be taken
into account in the effort to find new solutions. In this
sense, there is a heavy preponderance of "dissatisfied"
states. The basic positions of developed and developing
countries, however, are essentially the same.
THa developed states, because of their qlobal interests,
still seek to preserve the "Freedom of the Seas" , while
taking a conservative position on the issue of sea-bed
resources. The developing countries, meanwhile, continue
to show predominate concern for national interests directly
seaward of their own coasts. They reject becoming subject
to the economic and technical domination of one or another
developed country [Ref. 60, 76], and demand their aspirations
be taken into consideration by any new regime for the oceans.
For this reason, they favor a strong international authority
to govern exploitive activities on the sea-bed beyond
national jurisdiction.
Whereas the polarization had previously been between
"satisfied" and "dissatisfied", we now have a four-way
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split. The Maltese initiative of 1967, has resulted in a
disparity of interests not only between developed and
developing, but between coastal and land-locked and shelf-
limited states as well. The land-locked and shelf-limited,
in the desire to maximize their share of the "common heri-
tage", might be expected to join with the developed coastal
states in the effort to limit national jurisdiction, at
least with regard to the sea-bed. On the other hand,
developing coastal nations, who constitute the majority of
coastal states and are showing increasing reluctance to
negotiate resources piecemeal, are likely to resist narrow
definitions of national jurisdiction.
Ambassador Pardo of Malta has stated [Ref . 72]
:
" it ^c difficult ''"'"* envis p\cc an i ntp.T-
nationany agreed outer boundary ul uod^Lai
State jurisdiction being established at
much less than 200 nautical miles from the
coast.
"
He goes farther to propose the division of this area into
an "inner zone" in which the coastal state would exercise
"quasi sovereignty", with rights established by Treaty, and
an "outer zone" where [Ref. 72]:
"...the coastal State would enjoy preferential
but not exclusive rights to resource
exploitation.
"
The above proposal is similar to many other "intermediate
zone" concepts previously suggested, including the United
States draft sea-bed regime [Ref. 50] . Because of the width
of the area suggested, it is quite doubtful that the developed
coastal states would ever agree to Pardo 1 s proposal. Without
their support no regime would be long viable.
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IV . OCEANOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS
Before man leaps into the marine environment with a view
toward wresting out its resources, it behooves him to take
a close look at those factors which may influence his
activities there. These include: the distribution of the
resources he hopes to acquire; the nature of the environment
in which they are to be found; and the possible problems he
may encounter or create in the course of his activities.
These factors should also influence the nature of the regime
under which he operates, just as they influenced the regu-
latory regimes established in every ether new frontier area
man has penetrated in the past.
A. GEOLOGICAL
Geologists commonly divide the earth into two great
physiographic provinces, the continents and the ocean
basins. Because the volume of water on earth exceeds that
which can be contained in the ocean basins, large portions
of the continents are submerged. These submerged areas
constitute the "continental margins" of the world, and can
be differentiated from true "oceanic" crustal material by
variations in chemistry and physical structure.
Not all sea-beds, moreover, contain "oceanic" crustal
material. Many "marginal seas" are in fact no more than
great depositional basins or depressions in the continental
margin, and are everywhere underlain by "continental" crust.
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The Caribbean, North Sea and South China Sea are examples
of such "marginal seas" [Ref. 23, 77].
The continental shelf is generally considered to be that
portion of the continental margin landward of a point of
marked increase in the slope which descends to the floor of
the ocean basin. The shelf itself slopes gently seaward, and
constitutes a submerged platform bordering the emergent con-
tinental land mass. Reference 78 provides considerable
detail on the continental shelf areas of the world. It
points out that whereas "the average depth of the shelf edge
is at 133 meters with an average width of 40 miles" , wide
variance from these average values is the general rule. In
many areas [Ref. 78]
:
"...the shelf edqe is indistinct and is more of
Since such wide variation in the geographical continental
shelf exists, any uniform lateral limit to the continental
shelf constitutes a political rather than an oceanographic
boundary. As such, its legal delineation will depend solely
on a compromise among the interests of states.
1. Distribution of Mineral Resources
McKelvey and Wang [Ref. 23] point out that funda-
mental geological differences between continents and ocean
basins have direct bearing on the types of mineral resources
to be found in each area. The continents are overlain by
thick accumulations of sediment. These sediments extend
out over the continental margin and underlie the marginal




In contrast to the continents and continental mar-
gins, the crust underlying the deep ocean basins is relatively
thin. Sediments here are also thin, being at most several
hundred meters to a few kilometers in thickness.
a. Petroleum
A United Nations report [Ref. 79] has observed
that the most important requirements for hydrocarbon form-
ation and accumulation are:
"...source beds with abundant organic matter,
reservoir rocks, and a favourable history of
sedimentation and structural development
resulting in structural and stratigraphic
traps.
"
In addition, Schneider [Ref. 80] points out that under normal
conditions sediment thicknesses of 15 to 20 kilometers are
^^v.ci^cy-e.^1 necessary to provide the qeothermal heating
necessary for petrochemical cracking. The same reference,
however, suggests that favorable conditions can also be
found in regions of somewhat less sediment thickness but
anomalously high geothermal gradient. Such conditions
exist in narrow but growing basins like the Red Sea.
In either case, sediment layers at least
several kilometers thick are known to be basic to petroleum
formation. Figure 5 indicates those areas having sufficient
thickness of sediment to contain possible petroleum resources.
In general, these areas include the continental margins,
marginal seas and internal seas like the Black Sea and
Hudson Bay. Petroleum deposits are also theoretically
possible in the continental rises of rifted continental
margins like that off the east coast of the United States
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[Ref . 80] . Because the sediments of the deep ocean basins
are relatively thin and undeformed , these areas are gener-
ally considered to have little petroleum potential [Ref. 19,
79].
b. "Hard" Minerals
The weathering and erosion processes acting on
the continental land mass result in large quantities of
minerals being carried to the sea by stream and river run-
off. These minerals are distributed over the continental
margin, the coEtrser material settling out closest to the
land and the fine farther seaward. Periodic slumping and
turbidity currents further distribute this land derived
sediment over wide areas. Reference 77 reports placer
deposits of aold , tin, diamonds and other minerals having
been discovered on the continental shelves of various
countries. The same reference lists sand, gravel, shells
(used in the manufacture of cement), sulfur, salt, and
phosphorite (a mineral having potential as a source of
fertilizer) as being found in continental shelf areas.
Since the bed-rock of the continental margin is
the same as that of the adjacent land, the minerals found
in the land can also be expected to occur off-shore.
Reference 79 indicates that vein and lode deposits of coal,
iron, tin and other metallic minerals are known to extend
under the sea in many areas.
Highly concentrated metalliferous sediments are
known to exist in the Red Sea. These are found in deep
(approximately 2000 meter) basins, and are believed to be
42

the result of precipitation from hot hydrothermal anoxic
brines formed when sea water comes in contact with submarine
volcanic magma. The sediments have high copper, zinc, lead,
silver and gold assays, not to mention iron, manganese,
mercury and other metals [Ref . 79]
.
The crust of the deep ocean basins is composed
primarily of basalt, as opposed to the granitic rock of
the continents. It is extremely unlikely, therefore, that
vein and lode deposits are to be found in the deep ocean
bed. The sedimentary layer consists primarily of red clay
and calcareous and siliceous pelagic oozes. Surficial
deposits of manganese nodules are also found. These nodules
are apparently precipitated from sea water, but the process
by which they form is unknown. They contain manganese,
nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, zinc and many other
metallic elements. The ratio of the constituent metals
varies from ocean to ocean, and within any given ocean.
In general, however, nodules having the highest percentage
of the more valuable elements (Cu , Co, Ni) are found in the
deepest water [Ref. 79]
.
2. Prospects for Development
Petroleum presently constitutes approximately 90% of
the total value of subsea mineral production. Although the
mining of placer and bed-rock deposits is in progress in
many areas of the world, total annual production from these
sources amounts to less than 1% of onshore mineral production
[Ref. 23] . Further expansion of "hard" minerals operations
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will depend heavily on geological, technological and
economic events.
Offshore placer deposits are normally found in con-
junction with adjacent land deposits. Although many areas
of the world hold promise for development, evidence exists
that deposits of economic importance are likely to be
limited to local shelf areas less than 160 meters deep
[Ref . 79] . This is well within presently recognized limits
of national jurisdiction.
Present underground mining efforts are limited to
undersea extensions of mine shafts sunk ashore, and sulfur
extraction by the Frasch process. Undersea shaft mining
has taken place for hundreds of years, with over 100 mines
extracting coal, iron ore, nickel, coooer . tin and lime-
stone to date [Ref. 79] . Sulfur extraction from salt-dome
deposits is undertaken from structures similar to those
used by the offshore oil industry, and currently yields
about 20% of total United States production [Ref. 23] . In
order to initiate underground mining in areas of the contin-
ental margin far from land, however, two developments are
necessary: the detailed geological mapping of the area to
reveal the location of promising deposits; and the develop-
ment of a technique for deep water extraction of bedded
deposits. Both of these efforts are in their infancy [Ref.
77, 79].
Of all the mineral deposits known to exist on or in
the continental margin, petroleum shows the most promise for
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expanded development in the immediate future [Ref. 23, 77,
79] . This development includes not only increased economic
value, but expanded depth capability as well. It has been
estimated that offshore petroleum will constitute 33-35% of
total world output by 1980 [Ref. 23, 79]. Operations as
deep as 1500 meters are expected to be feasible by the same
year [Ref. 19] . The development of new survey techniques
[Ref. 81] , use of submersibles for underwater operations
[Ref. 81, 82] , employment of mobile drilling ships and rigs
[Ref. 19] , and construction of underwater production systems
[Ref. 83] , will make operations at even greater depths
technically possible in the foreseeable future.
It is economic feasibility, however, that will
ment. Current estimates of the price of oil extracted from
oil shales range from $4.00 to $5.00 per barrel [Ref. 80,
84] . This effectively sets an upper limit to the price of
crude oil produced from wells. Since the costs of offshore
operations increase almost exponentially with depth, it is
possible that a point may be reached beyond which further
development, though technically possible, is either economic-
ally unfeasible or limited to unusually large fields [Ref.
19, 20].
Although Reference 85 reports one American and one
German firm are investigating the commercial feasibility of
exploiting the Red Sea metalliferous sediments, maganese
nodules are the deep sea mineral resource showing the
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greatest promise of imminent exploitation. A number of
firms are presently active in this field. Reference 86 reviewed
the effort of Kennecott Explorations, Inc. to map geo-
logically and assay various nodule deposits. In late 1970,
a Japanese firm successfully recovered nodules from a depth
of 3,760 meters in the Pacific using a "continuous line
bucket" dredge system [Ref. 85, 87].
In the United States, Deepsea Ventures, a subsidiary
of Tenneco, Inc. , has developed both a recovery and a
refining process for manganese nodules. The recovery
system, described in References 88-89, was successfully
tested in approximately 3000 feet of water in July 1970.
The refinery, using a continuous flow hydrometallurgica.l
process, j.^ presently undergoing pilot-plant testing in
Virginia. Recovery of 95% of the manganese, nickel, copper
and cobalt has been reported, and efforts to extract other
metals are continuing. Deepsea Ventures is presently
attempting to organize an international consortium to
finance full scale production from one million tons of nodules
by 1975-76. Total outlay necessary to achieve full production
is estimated at $200 million [Ref. 25] . To be economically
feasible, this operation would require, as a minimum, a 20-
year lease on a 1000 square mile area of sea-bed having suf-
ficient nodule density. Several suitable locations have been
selected in the Pacific [Ref. 90]
.
Using nodule assays from a prime candidate site in the
Pacific, Deepsea Ventures has estimated that a one million
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ton per annum operation would produce 12,600 tons of
nickel; 10,000 tons of copper, 2,400 tons of cobalt;
and 260,000 tons of manganese [Ref. 25]. Based on statistics
for these minerals reported in Reference 91, one company
producing one million tons of nodules per annum would produce
approximately 3.5% of the manganese; 0.2% of the copper;
14.6% of the cobalt; and 2.5% of the nickel produced by the
entire world in 1967. Since the world demand for metals is
constantly increasing, it is possible that this level of pro-
duction could be absorbed by the world market without serious
price drops occurring. Based on 1967 prices, the total
market value of the metals would be $58,390,801. Assuming
a 10% tax on the gross value, income to a hypothetical
international aqencv from the operations of this one company
would be approximately $5,840,000.
Because of the high initial investment required, the
commercial exploitation of manganese nodules is likely to
remain a limited entry industry for a considerable time.
Operations by even ten companies at the level of one million
tons per year, however, might cause serious world price dis-
locations. The overall effects will depend on the amount of
increased demand for the metals concerned, which in turn is
dependent on the development of new uses, discovery of
additional sources, and the state of the overall world
economy. Even assuming prices could be maintained at the
1967 level, a tax on the production of ten million tons
would net an international agency only about $58,400,000.
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Although a considerable sum, this amount, falls far short
of that required to improve measurably the status of
developing countries.
The only other minerals industry showing imminent
prospects for expansion beyond the 200-meter isobath is the
petroleum industry. McKelvey [Ref. 92] points out that
petroleum leases since 1954 have brought $4.4 billion into
the United States Treasury alone. This amounts to about
$260 million per annum. If one of the primary objectives
of an international regime for exploitation of the sea-bed
is the maximization of funds for international development,
this objective would best be satisfied by including under
the international regime the maximum amount of area favorable
for petroleum development (Figs. 5. 9). Since these areas
are limited to the continental margins, marginal seas and
internal seas, such a system would require the stipulation
of narrow limits for coastal state jurisdiction.
B. BIOLOGICAL
Latest estimates of the maximum sustainable yield of
living resources from the oceans range from 180 million to
two billion metric tons annually [Ref. 93] . The total
world catch in 1969, however, amounted to only 63.1 million
metric tons [Ref. 53] . Using the most conservative esti-
mate, it becomes readily apparent that mankind is presently
utilizing only about one-third of this potential resource.
When one considers that the 1970 total value of fish, shell-
fish, and other aquatic plants and animals caught by United
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States fisherman alone was $602 million, it becomes obvious
that the rational development of these living resources
could do much to satisfy the economic, as well as the nutri-
tional, needs of the world [Ref. 94]
.
Many of the problems related to fisheries development
are a direct consequence of the nature of the resource.
Considered "common property", the living resources have
traditionally been exploited in accordance with the principle
of "Right of Capture". This "first-come, first-served" or
"finders keepers" approach has often lead to economic waste
and inefficiency, resulting in overfishing in some areas and
underfishing in others [Ref. 1, 10]. Despite the advantages
to be gained from rational management (including restricted
entry, catch auotas, etc.), fishermen have traditionally
opposed any form of regulation which would limit their share
of the catch. International fisheries commissions presently
in existance lack the authority to take independent action
on fisheries problems. They can only recommend to member
governments a preferred course of action. The failure to
take effective national action, despite repeated warnings
by the International Whaling Commission, has resulted in
the virtual extinction of several species of Antarctic
whales.
Rational management and maximum utilization of resources
are also frustrated by the unilateral expansion of coastal
state fisheries jurisdiction. Peru, for example, claims a
200-mile territorial sea, and has seized the boats of other
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nations fishing for tuna in these waters. The majority of
Peru's domestic fishing effort, however, is devoted to the
taking of anchoveta in coastal waters [Ref. 38, 95]. In
the opinion of an oceanographer serving with the United
States Marine Fisheries Service [Ref. 96]
:
"At least 90% of all Peruvian anchoveta and
tuna fishing takes place within 50 miles of
the coast. "
Obviously, Peru seeks to protect her interests by reserving
the large tuna population farther off her coast for the
future expansion of her own fishing industry. Whereas such
considerations might be valid for "one-time only" resources
like minerals, they are invalid for renewable living
resources. In the absence of fishing, natural processes,
such as Lli^_ cjftipet.ition fcr available fcc^l, tend to maintain
the population within stable limits. To the extent this
resource is not presently utilized, therefore, it is wasted.
Figure 8 illustrates the intensity of fisheries
exploitation in 1963. Although world fishing activity has
increased markedly in the interim, much of the data repre-
sented in this figure still holds true. Exceptions include
the Peruvian anchoveta fishery, which, having apparently
reached the maximum sustainable level of exploitation, has
been limited by government imposed seasonal quotas since
1965 [Ref. 95]. Schaefer and Alverson [Ref. 98] point out
that the demersal fish (flounders, sole, halibut, cod, etc.)
are the most heavily exploited community at present. Many
demersal species exist, however, which remain virtually
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untouched. This is especially true of many species of
Crustacea, which show great potential for commercial
development [Ref. 98, 99]. The pelagic fishes (tunas,
sardines, jacks, etc.) are presently expoited far below
their world-wide potential. Some experts estimate only 5%
of this resource is presently being utilized [Ref. 98]
.
Technology has made possible world ranging integrated
fishing fleets, the development of fish protein concen-
trates as dietary supplements, and the promising new field
of marine pharmacology. All these activities have one thing
in common: a dependence on a continuous supply of raw
material. Any event in hydrospace which disrupts this
supply, be it over-fishing or dissipation through pollution
or distraction of hatcheries, nullifies the benefits other-
wise obtainable. Efforts to protect and conserve living
resources through the expansion of national jurisdiction are,
at most, ineffective. Fish recognize no national boundaries,
many species migrating thousands of miles in the course of
their life cycle. The very species that Peru seeks to pro-
tect, the Skipjack Tuna, is known to spend much of its life
in the central Pacific [Ref. 100] . Overfishing in the
central Pacific spawning ground would dash any hope Peru has
of developing a tuna fishery within 200 miles of its coast.
It is obvious that the interests of coastal states having
economies heavily dependent on fishing must be taken into
account. Nevertheless, the full potential of the living
resources of the seas can best be realized by the appli-
cation of effective "range management" techniques on an
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oceanic scale [Ref . 98] . Since living resources respond to
environmental stimulli, we must determine what factors
(diet, physical parameters, etc.) enhance population growth,
and prevent disruptive occurrences. Harvesting must be
based on the maximum sustainable yield for each species and
each area, with due consideration given to the effect the
harvesting of lower species might have on those higher in
the food chain. In short, the ecology of the entire marine
environment must be considered.
Definitive answers to these questions will require a
tremendous amount of scientific data and study. International
fisheries commissions, the United Nations Food and Agri-
cultural Organization, and scientific institutions around
-^Vv~
..,^,-,--i,q i~. -wr» i r.nrr hp«n active in thi s regard. Also
required, however, is a level of international cooperation
and coordination in exploitation heretofore unknown. The
living resources of the sea are also part of the "common
heritage of mankind". Without international coordination,
optimum development of these resources is impossible.
C. PHYSICAL
While even the most primitive of peoples can recognize
the interface between atmosphere and water and land and
water, relatively few "educated" people realize that the
water which covers more than 70% of the globe is not a
homogeneous mass. Wide variation in salinity, temperature,
and dissolved gas content results in both horizontal and
vertical inhomogeneity. The oceans are stratified. Varying
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density results in layers having different physical
properties, along the boundaries of which "internal waves"
are known to propogate. Density effects drive horizontal
and vertical circulations over large areas.
In the last century it was commonly believed that the
waters at great ocean depth were totally devoid of movement
and organic life. With the advent of deep bottom samplers,
underwater cameras and manned submersibles , however , it
became obvious that life exists at all depths, what's more,
the observation of ripple patterns on the deep sea-bed made
it obvious that currents of considerable velocity do occur
along the bottom. Sampling and identification of water
masses by salinity and temperature characteristics lead to
the realization that water formed in one area may spread
over great distances. The deep and bottom water of much of
the world ocean has been traced to its point of formation
on the continental shelf of Antarctica [Ref . 101]
.
Whereas meteorology has progressed beyond the descriptive
phase to where it now seeks to predict atmospheric events,
physical oceanographers are still trying to describe many
of the processes and interactions at work in the marine
environment. A glance at an oceanographic atlas with its
neat representation of currents is misleading. Although the
general circulation of the oceans and its relationship to
the circulation of the atmosphere are fairly well established,
the details in time and space are virtually unknown. A
value of local current velocity extracted from an atlas may
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have no resemblance in either direction or magnitude to
values subsequently observed. Perturbations from mean
conditions caused by the constant interaction of planetary
and local influences like the wind field, the mass distri-
bution, the temperature distribution and the bottom topog-
raphy are poorly understood at present. The Gulf Stream
is one of the most intensely studied oceanic areas in the
world; yet, although descriptions and theories explaining
its behavior are available, no one has succeeded in con-
structing a detailed mathematical model of its circulation
[Ref . 102]
.
Currents are not the only phenomena still requiring
definition. The mechanisms of air-sea interaction which
prod"c^ waves, inc.1 vdi.ncj the anomalously hinh "storm surges"
associated with hurricanes, have yet to be fully determined.
Just as vital is an understanding of the processes by
which waves propogate and eventually die out, and by which
other physical parameters become subject to change.
The objective of the physical oceanographer is an
ability to use his understanding of ocean processes to make
predictions of oceanic events. An ability to predict waves
alone could save millions of dollars and countless lives
each year by timely warnings to ships and coastal areas.
Current predictions are vital to adequate pollution control.
Accurately predicted temperature and salinity distributions
would facilitate the location of fish stocks, many species




Even though our understanding of fundamental ocean pro-
cesses is limited, efforts at environmental prediction have
begun. The United States has funded $145,197,000 for the
Marine Environmental Prediction (MAREP) Program in fiscal
year 1972 [Ref. 103]. Other countries have also instituted
national programs. A truly effective environmental pre-
diction system, however, requires real time data collection,
storage and retrieval on a global scale. Because of
political and economic realities, such a system is obviously
beyond the capabilities of any one nation. The United
Nations Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission has proposed
an Integrated Global Ocean Station System (IGOSS) . This
system would operate in close conjunction with the World
Weather Watch of the World Meteoroloqica] Organization to
provide information and forecasting services on a global
scale [Ref. 104]
.
A cooperative effort such as IGOSS can have dramatic
impact. Since all activities in ocean space are dependent
in one way or another on the state of the environment, an
international oceanic prediction system can do much to
promote the rational development of marine resources, while
contributing to the protection of both man and the
environment.
D. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
As activities in the marine environment become more
intense, the problem of resolving incompatible uses of the
same area will increase proportionately. This is especially
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true of those areas, like the continental margin, having
a multiplicity of potential uses. It cannot be assumed
that any one activity will not influence, or itself be
affected by, other activities in the same region. Reference
105, for example, mentions the sad history of a mulci--
million dollar telephone cable recently laid between South
Africa and Lisbon. The cable was implaced without apparent
realization of the intense trawling activity along its
route. Such cases are a direct consequence of a lack of
communication and coordination at the international level.
Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf
establishes the right of the coastal state to establish
"safety zones" of up to 500 meters around installations con-
->
» '.M>_L-^d wi. iLc .,i.z.lf Trie f . Ci ~* . Ao 3-onQ n s 3 c 1 3 v "i t "i ^ s were
confined to shallow water and structures extended above the
water surface, this concept proved workable. As operations
extend to deeper water, however, and completely submerged
production facilities come into greater use, problems of
coordination between multiple uses of the same area are
bound to increase. Submerged installationswhich project
into the superadjacent waters constitute a potential
hazard to fishermen and shipping. Adequate safeguards
must be taken.
Beyond limits of national jurisdiction, however, this
problem takes on new proportions. Freedom to exploit the
mineral resources of the sea-bed is not one of the ''Freedoms




on the High Seas [Ref. 106]. What's more, there is no
basis in international law for the establishment of "safety
zones" around ships drilling or dredging for commercial
purposes in international waters. The same applies to sub-
merged installations constructed on the sea-bed. Although
an entrepreneur would understandably desire to exercise
some measure of control over the area around and over his
operation, such control constitutes an infringement on the
rights of others and to date has no legal justification.
Advancing technology has resulted in a number of other
"grey areas" in existing international law. The legal status
of submersibles engaged in construction, salvage or other
operations on the bottom is subject to question. So too
are uriuiuUxied environmental data buoys anchored or drifting
in international waters.
Perhaps the greatest effect of intensified use of ocean
space is the increasing incidence of environmental pollution.
Since "one man's waste is another man's pollution," this too
constitutes a problem of reconciling alternative uses.
Because ocean currents can distribute the effects of pollu-
tion over wide areas, however, this problem takes on much
greater significance than the problem of competition for
local areas.
17Recognized freedoms are [Ref. 106 [
:
" (1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas."
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As pointed out in Section IV, C. , our knowledge of the
time and spatial perturbations of mean ocean circulation
patterns is limited. Stommel has observed [Ref. 107]
:
"From the scattered pieces of evidence that
are at present available it appears that
the dynamics of the oceanic circulation, and
the transport of various properties in the
sea, may actually be dominated by the large
scale, transient, turbulent processes which
hitherto have been ignored by observers, and
which theoretical workers had hoped to bypass."
While the processes are poorly understood, the effects are
all too obvious. In many areas density stratification
inhibits mixing of water masses and dispersion of pollu-
tants. The result is high concentration of the pollutant
in a particular water mass. This phenomenon has been
observed in the coastal waters of the United States [Ref.
108] .
Pollution is actually a result of preoccupation with
production as an end unto itself. The wastes which occur
as a by-product of any production process have tradition-
ally been disposed of at the least possible direct cost to
the producer. When the waste is harmless this is beneficial,
since it results in lower prices for the consumer. When
the result is environmental deterioration, however, it
means that the cost burden has only been shifted from the
producer to society as a whole [Ref. 108]
.
The problem arises: What wastes constitute an environ-
mental hazard? The Consultative Assembly of the Council of




"...the absence of fundamental oceanic-
research should be a reason for extreme
caution rather than a pretext for dumping
dangerous waste into the sea."
Carrying this proposition one step further, others have
recommended [Ref . 105]
:
"...shifting the burden of proof from those
who could be hurt by pollutants to those
who are doing the polluting; that is, the
polluters should be made to provide reason-
able proof that their activities are
harmless.
"
The incentive to shift the burden of proof is especially
strong in relation to new users of ocean space. The prob-
lem arises, however, of reconciling the need for complete
assurance of safety for the environment with the unwilling-
ness of the entrepreneur to release zealously guarded
"prep 1"1 ef^rv iivformg-hion" concerning his projected area of
operations. This has long been a problem in offshore oil
exploitation. Following the oil well blowout in the Santa
Barbara Channel in 1969, the efforts of the United States
Geological Survey to evaluate the situation were seriously
hampered by a lack of geophysical data. The oil companies
had the data, but did not release it until Secretary of the
Interior Walter Hickel personally stepped in and requested
it [Ref. 110].
The mining of surficial deposits at sea, whether it be
manganese nodules at great depth or deposits in shallower
water, can also have widespread environmental consequences.
Methods proposed to date have relied almost exclusively on
dredging techniques. Experience in shallow water, however,
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has shown that dredging operations in one area can result
in shoaling in other areas due to the large amount of
fines stirred up and carried away by currents. Agitation
of sediments can also result in previously precipitated
chemical compounds being thrust into solution again [Ref.
108] .
Whereas shoaling per se would not be a problem in deep
water dredging operations, a large quantity of fines placed
into suspension could have even more serious effects. They
could settle bach into the area of excavation, burying the
desired surficial deposits and, thereby, increase operating
costs. Should the turbidity reach the surface layer, it
would increase light attenuation and result in decreased
OiiOtOo T7nthetic ..-* !.ii'iT i'1"tr c-i npr the ocscm food chain is
based on the primary productivity of the phytoplankton
,
this could have serious impact on living resources in the
area. If these fines did not reach the surface, but became
entrapped by density stratification, they could be carried
long distances by currents before settling to the bottom.
A particle four microns in diameter has a settling velocity
of only about one meter a day [Ref. 101] . Particles up to
the size of fine sand are known to have been transported
large distances in a strongly stratified ocean [Ref. Ill]
.
There is little doubt that benthic organisms in the
immediate area will be destroyed by the dredging operation
itself. In addition, suspended material may be spread over
large areas by bottom currents, resulting in the burial of
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even more benthic life. Since demersal species are largely
dependent on the bottom for food, the exploitation of sea-
bed minerals could have an indirect effect on fisheries
based on these demersal species. More directly, any
toxicants introduced in the course of shipboard benefici-
ation processes or as a result of sediment agitation could
result in destruction of all living resources over a wide
area [Ref . 99]
.
Shifting the burden of proof to the entrepreneur in the
case of sea-bed raining operations would require him to
present evidence that no part of his operation constitutes
an inherent environmental hazard. This would necessarily
include not only immediate local effects, but more extended
requirement are known. Prior to granting Dillingham Corp-
oration a license to mine aragonite by dredging off Bimini
,
the government of the Bahamas required an "uninterested
party" ecological survey of the area. No objection being
found, operations were commenced under the condition that
the area be continuously monitored to detect deleterious
ecological effects and that "buffer zones" would be estab-
lished where necessary to protect the environment [Ref. 112].
For areas beyond limits of national jurisdiction, inter-
national solutions to the problem of pollution are necessary.
Because of the intimate relationship between sea-bed minerals
exploitation and the living resources of the superad jacent
waters, any international regime for the former must include
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adequate safeguards for the environment as a whole. In
addition, it is senseless to enjoin individuals from dumping
wastes into the ocean if states themselves are left free to
dump anything they please. International regulation of all
ocean dumping is necessary if the deterioration of the
marine environment is to be checked.
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V. OTHER OBJECTIVES CONSIDERATIONS
The marine areas of the earth constitute an environ-
ment inherently hostile to man. It is only through the
utilization of his technology that man can venture into
this environment at all, and only technology can force the
seas to give up their resources for his benefit. Technology
does not come cheap, however. This is especially true of
efforts to extract the mineral resources of the sea-bed,
where investments amounting to hundreds of millions of
dollars are the general rule. A regime to be established
in ocean space, therefore, must be structured in such a way
as not to inhibit the economic development of marine
resources.
Christy [Ref. 10] has provided an analysis of the econo-
mic factors which must be taken into account in devising
rules for the governance of deep-sea minerals exploitation.
He points out that "common property" resources have
traditionally been exploited with considerable economic
waste and inefficiency due to the lack of exclusive rights
to the resources. La Que [Ref. 91] , in evaluating the
prospects for deep ocean mining, assumes that even though
some deposits of manganese nodules are known to be of higher
value than others
:
"Such hot spots probably would be large enough
to accommodate a number of exploitation
activities simultaneously. This would
moderate or even eliminate competition for
concessions for exploitation of defined areas."
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The latter would imply that exclusive rights are
unnecessary.
Such a situation would prove contrary to recent experi-
ence with other marine resources. The offshore oil industry
has required exclusive rights to petroleum resources from
the beginning. Individual companies jealously guard re-
search data on prospective sites, and competition for
leaseholds is keen. The same is true of other industries
active on the continental shelf. In addition, the recent
efforts of coastal states to acquire exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction has been noted time and again. Such consider-
ations as nodule assay and density, water depth, proximity
to shore support and ore beneficiation facilities, and the
size of area necessary for profitable operations are likely
to make exclusive rights to certain areas desireable in
manganese nodule exploitation as well. Recent public state-
ments by representatives of those firms about to engage in
this activity bear this out [Ref . 90]
.
Besides benefiting the individual, the granting of
exclusive operating areas to entrepreneurs also holds
certain advantages for society as a whole. By restricting
operations to a specified area, interference with other
users of ocean space can be minimized. Then, too, efficient
exploitation of marine resources would result from requiring
the entrepreneur to achieve the maximum yield from his
leasehold, rather than indiscriminately exploiting over a
wide area. This would avoid the problems experienced with
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"common property" resources in the past. Finally, the
designation of operating areas would facilitate the fixing
of responsibility for environmental damage.
In addition to exclusive rights, a regime for the govern-
ance of marine resource exploitation must also supply
security of tenure. This is necessary to insure the
entrepreneur's ability to make a profit over and above his
huge initial investment and operating costs. A secure
investment climate is absolutely essential before business
will undertake high risk ventures in ocean space.
If an additional purpose of the regime is the collection
of revenue from economic rents or taxes on resource pro-
duction, care must be exercised in the imposition of these
rCi-^. Injudiciously high r^nt~ royalties, taxes,, work
requirements, or other costly obligations may retard develop-
ment by discouraging commercial enterprises. This fact is
often overlooked by those who envision vast sums for inter-
national development purposes being derived from a regime
for the sea-bed. Without first establishing a favorable
investment climate, no income is the more likely outcome.
The common practice in United States offshore oil
development has been the sale of leases through competitive
cash bidding on tracts designated by the government. In
addition to the lease price, the oil companies also pay
bonuses based on production. Such methods may be inappropri-
ate for operations in deeper water. Because of the high
risk nature of such operations and the huge initial invest-
ment required, bids are likely to be extremely low and
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bidders few. Then too, production from such activities as
manganese nodule mining is likely to be kept quite low to
avoid flooding the market and disrupting prices. This
would result in low bonus payments.
An alternative system which might prove more appropri-
ate would totally avoid "front end" cash requirements
except for a nominal licensing fee. Such a system might
require competitive bids for leases based on a percentage
of gross or net income gained from the exploitive activity.
The first (a percentage of gross income) would constitute
a tax on total production. The second would amount to a
tax on profits alone. To insure more than token payment to
the regime in the early years of deep water resource develop-
"•;er f a percentage might- be established as the minimum
acceptable bid. It might be decided, for example, that 10%
of gross or net income was the minimum amount the regime
would accept as its "fair share" from the exploitation of
manganese nodules.
Such a system based on gross income would promote
economic efficiency in the exploitation of marine resources
by discouraging from entering bids all but those who felt
assured of their ability to exploit economically. In the
initial stages of development, however, lack of experience
in such high risk ventures might act to deter all bids
based on gross income. Since all the first efforts at
deep water exploitation will be somewhat speculative in
nature, it would appear more logical to extract revenue for
the regime from net income. This will, of course, greatly
reduce the income accruing to the regime.
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Other devices used in the past to promote economic
efficiency in minerals exploitation have included rental
fees and "work requirements". By the latter, the exploiter
is required to meet a certain level of production from his
leasehold. Failure to do so results in either penalties or
forfeiture of the lease. In applying these methods to deep
water operations, care must be exercised to avoid the
imposition of too stringent requirements on a technology
still in the developmental stage. Reference 50 includes
proposed rental fees and work requirements for the
exploitation of sea-bed minerals. References 16 and 40
include industry objections and suggested revisions to this
proposal. Realistic requirements must be based on sound
^ c ^,-,.~,m-i r< rp-qnnina and the technoloaical realities involved
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VI . ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: PRO AND CON
A. THE PROBLEM - CONCISELY
"Freedom of Access" to marine resources was a workable
concept so long as the marine environment was essentially a
"no man's land". With more intensive use of this environ-
ment and no policeman, "Freedom of the Seas" did not prevent
individual states from expropriating specific resources for
their exclusive use. A legal concept by itself is not suf-
ficient to regulate activities in what amounts to an
organizational vacuum.
Present intergovernmental organizations having interests
in marine activities, including agencies of the United
Nations and region?.! groups, exercise u^ regulatory and
enforcement powers respecting such activities. They solely
consult and coordinate, without authority to take independent
action to assure the rational and equitable development of
marine resources. Dependent as they are on the financial
support and cooperative action of member governments, they
are incapable of providing the strong leadership necessary
to resolve the growing problems arising from conflicting
interests and environmental deterioration.
The situation on the international scene is analogous
to that which existed in the United States prior to 1970.
There is no single agency having cognizance over activities
in ocean space. Responsibility is split among a number of
separate organizations (FAO, UNESCO/IOC , IAEA, regional
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fisheries commissions, the U.N. General Assembly, its Sea-
Bed Committee, etc.) while any effective international
authority is non-existent. Similar circumstances within
the United States moved the President's Commission on Marine
Science, Engineering and Resources to recommend the estab-
lishment of a unified authority to coordinate United States
efforts in this area. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration was the result [Ref . 113]
.
Marine technology, and many other "global technologies"
of this century, have widespread effects beyond limits of
national jurisdiction. The desire to regulate competing
interests and maximize the benefits obtainable from new
technology has lead to the formation of such agencies as
fch<? InteriiSt J '"'H.al atomic ^Jp^rCIV ^t^it'"'" ,- ;-. -n.-^ H-lno TaT .".-.- 1 /-I
Meteorological Organization [Ref. 114]. Support for some
such solution to marine environmental problems is growing.
It is apparent in statements of various delegates to the
United Nations, most notably that of Ambassador Pardo of
Malta in his communication to the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe in December 1970 [Ref. 72]. The
International Council of Scientific Unions stated as long
ago as 1967 [Ref. 116] :
"As we see the situation at this time we are
convinced that in the long run it will be
necessary to combine in one intergovernmental
agency most of the functions now carried out
in ocean science and technology and the uses
of the ocean by many different intergovern-
mental organizations, together with needed new
functions. The international character of
the living and non-living resources of the





There is at least one major difference between marine
technology and other global technologies. Whereas atomic
energy, for example, holds promise of long term future
benefits, the development of marine resources provides
direct and immediate economic advantages to groups capable
of such activities. It is this instant capture of benefits
that has stimulated the expansion of coastal state juris-
diction in recent years. A regime established for ocean
space, therefore, must not only promote technological
development and environmental protection ; it must satisfy
apparently divergent political and economic interests of
various nationals and states as well.
B. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A Cio Li >• : Liua QH't •<- iiiuu>. .' >e l ween '"J^^ Lbie poi-iticai/
legal regimes and organizational machinery for the regu-
lation of activities in the marine environment. The
alternative regimes may be characterized as: 1. Expanded
National Domains; 2. Limited International Regulatory
Domain; or 3. An Independent Governing Authority for the
Ocean. Organizational machinery operative under expanded
national domains would be that of the individual states
acquiring greater jurisdiction. International machinery
could be given any one of a number of forms, with wide
variation in discretionary authority. Presumably, only the
third solution would reach beyond intergovernmental machinery
and attempt to create a distinct ocean authority in juxta-
position to national governments.
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The Center for Naval Analyses, in Reference 117, pre-
sents an analysis of regulatory regimes for the governance
of the expoitation of the sea-bed. The following analysis
borrows the basic outline of the alternatives presented in
Reference 117 , but evaluates them as regards to their
acceptability as regulatory regimes for the marine environ-
ment as a whole. Many of the considerations, pro and con,
enumerated in Reference 117 were also found to be applicable
to the more general case considered herein.
1 . Expanded National Domain: The National Lakes Appr oach
The "National Lakes Approach" would represent the
ultimate extension of coastal state jurisdiction into ocean







-aKi-.fc ^ i~; = - ri <5 +- -f-h^-i- of nnnthrr p\ 1 dtio s msdi an line
between them. Such a system may evolve rapidly through
unilateral claims or by the gradual extension of the con-
tinental shelf under the "exploitability" principle of the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In the latter
case, the first areas to be affected would undoubtedly be
the "internal" and "marginal" seas which are underlain by
"continental" crustal material. Once the fever of expanding
national claims begins to spread, it will be difficult to
suppress efforts to apply the National Lake solution to the
oceans as well. The natural tendency on the part of states
to convert special interest zones into general interest
zones would result in claims to sea-bed jurisdiction being
widened to include the superad jacent waters as well.
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Factors supposedly favoring such a solution are:
1. It could be implemented immediately, with
no necessity of creating new international machinery.
2. Activities within each area would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the relevant metropolitan authorities.
Those states having efficient administrations could be
expected to administer their acquired National Lakes just as
efficiently. Entrepreneurs who were nationals of a posses-
sory state would benefit from being able to operate under
familiar laws throughout the expanded domain.
3. Each state would have complete jurisdiction
over activities off its shores, and could develop marine
resources for the maximum benefit of its people. National
territorial afroi""34- "" /~,r~,c: would ^~><^ finally assuacred , a.nd the
interests of those internal groups advocating expanded
national jurisdiction satisfied.
Disadvantages of such a solution are:
1. It would represent a nadir in international
cooperation, with great potential for conflict. Inter-
national commerce, fishing, scientific research and the
operations of naval forces would be seriously restricted,
forcing those states deeply involved in maritime activities
to take strong measures to protect their interests. A pro-
liferation of divergent national regulations would make the
effective management of living resources, the control of
pollution and the evolution of a system of ocean forecasting
difficult, if not impossible.
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2. Many areas would be exploited inefficiently,
because a majority of coastal states lack the technology,
managerial ability, or capital to do the job properly.
3. Licensed foreign operators in given areas
would be liable to arbitrary national actions, including
expropriation. Such instability would deter resource
development.
4. Such a solution is inequitable. It not only
discriminates against land-locked states, but also against
many coastal states. In a division based on equidistance,
thirteen countries would control approximately two-thirds
of the world's ocean area (roughly one-half of the planet)
[Ref. 118]. In addition, since marine resources are not
evenly di F+ributed throughout the oceans, some areas would
be immensely more valuable than others.
2. Limited International Regulatory Domain
a . Flag State Approach
The Flag State Approach, sometimes called the
"Right of First Discovery" approach, is actually an exten-
sion of the "Right of Capture" principle long applied to the
living resources of the sea. Under this system, a state
would administer, protect and be responsible for exploitive
activity under its registry in a manner analogous to the
jurisdiction exercised over ships flying its flag. Because
18
They are: "Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador,
France, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, USSR,
United Kingdom, United States."
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exploitable resources have economic value in their own
right, national jurisdiction would extend to the resource
or area of operations as well, if for no other reason than
the necessity of protecting the proprietary rights of
entrepreneurs. Although the administrative macninery would
be national, this system is included under the regime of a
Limited International Regulatory Domain because it pre-
supposes a region of "International Waters" beyond the
jurisdictional limits of coastal states.
The proponents of a Flag State Approach maintain
1. It is in accord with the principle of
"Freedom of Access" and existing international lav;.
2. This system can be reconciled with
existing pclitical/econoraic systems, and a ^.M uix"c: no new
international institutions or commitments.
3. Exploitation of marine resources has not
proceeded to the point where more elaborate systems are
necessary.
4. Resources are plentiful, so there's no
reason for conflict.
5. Entrepreneurs would operate under the
benefit of familiar law.
6. Proprietary information would be pro-
tected, it being necessary to release only that required
for safety and navigation.
7. Except for the relatively small areas in
which exploitation was in progress, there would be no re-
striction on the traditional "Freedom of the Seas".
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Disadvantages of such an approach are
:
1. At best, it could be applied only to
sea-bed resources found in the deep ocean basins beyond
the continental margin. Any attempt to extract the re-
sources of the continental margin of one coastal state, or
the sea-bed of "internal" and "marginal" seas, by nationals
of another state would establish "exploit-ability" within the
terms of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. The
adjacent coastal state (s) could forthwith legally extend
its (or their) jurisdiction over the area to such exploitable
depth [Ref . 11]
.
2. Marine resources are not evenly distributed
about the oceans. Variation in economic value will make
.-/-,mi-,o •!--;!--: nn for +~h& hinhpsi" niial i tv resources inevitable.
Competition would result in international tensions similar
to those which arise over living marine resources today.
3. Once such a system became entrenched,
its benefactors and operators would inhibit efforts to devise
more comprehensive international machinery if the latter
should prove necessary at a future date.
4. It is inequitable. The technologically
advanced states are the only ones who will possess the
capability of large scale, diversified exploitation in the
foreseeable future. By the time developing countries obtain
the means to participate, the most valuable areas would be
claimed by others.
5. Many of the problems emerging with
respect to the marine environment result from over-reliance
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on individual states to police their own activities. The
Flag State Approach by itself provides no security for the
quality of the marine environment. It provides no guarantee
against arbitrary decisions regarding resource development
priorities or discrimination vis a. vis other users of ocean
space. Initiatives would be entirely in the hands of the
entrepreneur, be he a state entity or state authorized
private person.
b. International Registry Approach
As with the Flag State Approach, the initiative
under this system would lie with the entrepreneurs. A flag
state, however, would proceed to register its entrepreneur's
claim and its own national claim to jurisdiction with an
i >-i4-oi-,-i^f
-i nnp) 1 ^rir<'nc\r TVi p 3CJ6HCV « on a " fir S
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served" basis, would then recognize the exclusive rights and
jurisdiction of the claimant state in the exploitive area
[Ref . 10]
.
The flexibility of this system is considerable.
Various structures are possible, ranging from a "Central
Filing Office" with authority only to register claims and
collect such fees as are necessary to defray expenses, to an
agency with broader powers allowing various degrees of
regulatory authority. The distinguishing feature of such
an agency, however, would be its total lack of legislative
authority. It would have no authority to adopt new rules,




Advantages of an International Registry Approach
are :
1. It is a mixed national/international
system which benefits participants without the necessity
of large international machinery. The major portion of
administrative and regulative tasks are left to national
entities. Those functions delegated to the registering
agency are clearly within the demonstrated capability of
international organization.
2. It would allow exploitation to proceed
immediately, while affording a mechanism whereby conflict
over resources could be settled peacefully.
3. If the participants choose, a portion of
revenues collected bv the aoency may be contributed to
international community purposes.
4. The claims of participating states would
have the benefit of international recognition, thus insuring
exclusive rights to resources. This would prevent the over-
capitalization and congestion that are the bane of common
property resources [Ref . 10] .
Disadvantages of such an approach are:
1. An International Registry would prove to
be of limited usefulness. Recognition of exclusive rights
to resources is only one of the problems requiring solution
in the immediate future. A registry with limited technical
staff and no legislative function would be incapable of
administering such new technologies as an environmental
predicticn service. Additional agencies having cognizance
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over other activities (fishing, pollution control, etc.)
would be required, resulting in greater fragmentation of
responsibility and authority.
2. Such a solution would legitimize exten-
sions of national jurisdiction into ocean space. In
addition to broad territorial seas along coastal areas, the
world would be covered by a patch-work quilt of national
claims in mid-ocean areas. Even assuming that uniform
standards for environmental quality accompanied the agreement
establishing the registry, it is doubtful that uniform
enforcement would result so long as sole responsibility for
it rested with individual states.
3. Registration of claims on a "first-come,
fircf-qp^roH" basis won id constitute a tremendous advantage
for developed states having the immediate capability to
explore and exploit. Forced to operate under this criterion,
the international agency would be powerless to plan a rational
development or reconcile conflicting uses of the same area.
The system would still be subservient to the entrepreneurs.
4. The competence of such an agency would
rest entirely on the foresight of the drafters of the
founding charter. Without legislative authority, it would
be powerless to react to changes in circumstances or knowledge
5. The "first-come, first-served" provision
does not insure that areas will go to the most efficient
producers. If claims were transferable, this could precipi-
tate widespread speculation and a rush to register claims.
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If claims were non-transferable, there would be an incentive
to produce even though net returns were marginal, in order
to preclude loss of the claim [Ref. 10].
c. International Authority Approach
Like the International Registry, an International
Autnority could assume a wide range of forms, depending en
the degree of discretionary powers granted by its charter.
Over all, however, it would represent a quantum jump in
international cooperative effort.
As generally envisioned, the authority (or
agency) would have jurisdiction over the granting of exclu-
sive rights to sea-bed resources. While not empowered to
change its founding directive, it would have sufficient
io.ix^Ic'.iv<- authority Lc enable it to react to changing
conditions. The agency would have authority to: grant
leases based on competitive bidding or other criteria;
prescribe regulations governing exploitation; extract fees
and distribute monies over and above its expenses. Depend-
ing on its scope of powers, it could also: inspect exploitive
activities; take steps to conserve resources and prevent
pollution; adjudicate disputes.
Such an agency would not have the authority to
undertake independently the exploitation of resources.
Exploitive activity would be carried out solely by member
states or their nationals. The agency would be further
"limited" in that final decisions would be made by the
representatives of the member states.
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The most comprehensive blueprint for an Inter-
national Authority which has been advanced is the United
States draft treaty on the sea-bed submitted to the United
Nations on August 3, 1970 [Ref. 50]. The United States
proposal would grant to the "International Seabed Resource
Authority" all of the prerogatives enumerated above. The
proposed operative machinery is illustrated in Figure 10.
Few changes would be necessary to transform
the "Seabed Authority" into what the world seems to need,
namely an effective Ocean Authority. For example, the
selection of priorities among competing uses in areas where
incompatible activities would constitute a problem should
be one task added to the "Operations Commission". Such
decisions must be based i.u uu analysis of economic ?.nd
environmental factors involved and not issued arbitrarily.
As in the case of all other decisions by the Commissions,
appeals may be made to the Tribunal.
A Fisheries Commission should be added. This
Commission would coordinate the activities of regional
fisheries commissions and the FAO, and otherwise promote
the maximum utilization of the living resources of the sea.
A Marine Research Commission would coordinate
research activities in physical and geological oceanography,
and administer an international environmental data collection
and prediction system. Neither this Commission nor the
Fisheries Commission described above need engage in research
activities directly. They could operate in a manner similar
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to the World Meteorological Organization, establishing
research priorities and plans to be carried out and
financed by national and regional scientific groups.
An Environmental Protection Commission should
be established. Although prevention of pollution is one
of the objectives of the inspection program of the "Operations
Commission" , and the monitoring of environmental quality
would be possible through an international data collection
system, some means of containing and alleviating the effects
of pollution once it occurs is necessary. One of the major
problems in coping with marine oi] spills today is the
excessive time lag experienced before necessary equipment
and experts are assembled. An International Environmental
Protecti t 1^ Comit-issj on cou3.d admin] sfcer p. sysfcsrn of regionally
distributed stockpiles of necessary equipment and supplies.
A contingent of experts could be flown to the scene of a
pollution incident anywhere in the world in a matter of
hours, just as specialists are rushed to the scene of
petroleum well fires today. The costs of cleanup operations
would be recoverable from the responsible party.
Additional responsibilities of the Environmental
Protection Commission could be similar to those of the
United States "Council on Environmental Quality" and "Office
of Environmental Quality" established by Public Law [Refs.
119 and 120 respectively] . The burden of proof with respect
to the possible impact of projected activities on the
environment could be shifted to the entrepreneur by requiring
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an environmental impact study (similar to that required by
U. S. Public Law) prior to granting a license. Such a study
should be conducted by a scientist or group of scientists
appointed by the Commission, the costs to be shared by the
Authority and the entrepreneur.
The voting formula prescribed by the United
States draft provides an equitable balance between the
interests of developed and developing states. In the
Assembly, the principle of "one nation, one vote" applies.
In the twenty-four member Council, a simple majority within
each member group (the six most industrially advanced states
and the eighteen elected states) is necessary to carry a
measure. It may prove necessary, however, to provide a
raeans Y>y which the Council can resolve deadlocks be tween
.
the.
two voting groups. A three-fourths majority of the total
Council membership might prove acceptable.
The United States draft requires that members
of the Commissions and Tribunal and the Secretary - General
be selected by the Council from a list of nominees provided
by the Assembly. Since the authority of the Commissions is
considerably increased in the Ocean Authority proposed above,
the role of the. Council would be the greater. In order to
provide a successful system of "checks and balances" , it
would be more equitable (and, perhaps, attract wider
acceptance) if the Tribunal members and the Secretary - General
were elected by the Assembly. In the event of death or
resignation of a Judge or the Secretary - General between
82

Assembly sessions, an interim appointment by the Council
could be authorized.
The machinery of an International Ocean Authority
embodying the above-mentioned modifications to the United
States draft sea-bed proposal is depicted in Figure 10.
Advantages of such an approach are
:
1. The distribution of wealth from the seas
would be equitable. Those states capable of exploiting
available resources could begin the necessary tasks, while
revenue sharing would benefit disadvantaged states.
2. Since ultimate authority would rest with
the member states, an organization responsive to the inter-
ests of the community of nations would result.
3. Assuming that a voting formula =-~-H method
of selecting Commissioners, Judges and Secretary - General
as described were adopted, no bloc could dominate the
agency.
4. Individual companies could apply for and
obtain leases to sea-bed resources.
5. Uniform standards and fees for exploitation
anywhere in the international area would be possible.
6. A secure investment climate free from
the threat of national expropriation would be established.
7. Control of access through exclusive leases
would allow the most efficient and economic exploitation of
resources.
8. A strong political entity existing in
ocean space would act as a check on national expansionist
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tendencies. By providing valuable and necessary services,
the Authority would promote international cooperation.
9. A mechanism for the peaceful settlement
of disputes in ocean space would be available.
10. International coordination of research
and development would make possible planned, controlled use
of ocean space, with protection for the environment and the
rights of its various users.
Disadvantages of such an approach are
:
1. Many nationalists feel such a solution
represents a threat to national sovereignty.
2. Unless its functions were carefully
managed, such an agency could become overly bureaucratised
.
Such b result would dissipate funds passionately wanted for
international development and other community purposes.
3. The practicality of this solution depends
entirely upon where the limit of coastal state jurisdiction
is established. Unless coastal state jurisdiction is
narrowly limited, there would be little income in the near
future to support such an agency.
4. The effectiveness of the agency would
depend upon the willingness of the members to accept its
decisions.
5. The injudicious imposition of high fees,




3 . Independent Ocean Governing Authority
An Independent Governing Authority for the Ocean
represents the antithesis of the National Lakes Approach.
The Authority would own the resources beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, and would exercise complete authority
over ocean activities in this area. It would have full
legislative powers. Delegates would be responsible to it
alone, thereby preventing the member states from dominating
the organization.
The organization would be empowered to: plan,
coordinate and participate in research and development;
inspect and regulate exploitive activities; collect fees
and taxes; distribute funds to developing countries; borrow
Kioney ; ceLC.'r uibyu^-r. In effect, J. in.: Authority would
constitute a supranational entity.
Figure 11 illustrates the structure of a model pro-
posed by Elizabeth Mann Borgese and Neil Jacoby. The Borgese
"Ocean Regime" would grant to an Independent Authority all
the prerogatives enumerated above, plus many more. These
would include authority to: protect developing countries
from the economic effects of market dislocations caused by
the exploitation of sea-bed minerals; provide training for
scientists and technicians from developing countries; pro-
mote better living and working conditions for workers
employed by marine industries under its jurisdiction; pro-
mote the development of international trade; inspect all
sea-bed installations, including military installations;
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actively engage in ocean demilitarization negotiations
[Ref . 29]
.
The Borgese proposal provides for a bicameral
system of voting in the "Maritime Assembly' 5
. The body of
states' representatives and whichever other chamber is
competent in the matter at issue vote separately. If the
two chambers fail to agree, they vote again in joint
session. In the latter case a simple majority is suffici-
ent for decision. In the "Maritime Commission" (or
governing council) each representative has one vote. Other
than for the Regime's development plan and budget, which
require a two-thirds majority for passage, decisions in
the "Commission" are by simple majority.
Advantacres of such an approach are
:
1. A comprehensive organization would allow
planned, efficient use of ocean space, with the greatest
degree of protection for the environment.
2. National expansionist tendencies would be
restrained by the existence of a strong regime.
3. Coordinated planning would foster resolution
of problems arising from conflicting uses of ocean space.
4. Such an Authority would provide a means for
the peaceful settlement of disputes.
5. No bloc could dominate the agency.
Disadvantages of such an approach are :
1. Such an autonomous authority might seek to
inhibir or prevent those uses of the sea which it independ-




2. By participating directly in ocean exploitation,
the Authority could retard the development of marine resources
by discouraging free enterprise and establishing, in effect,
a monopoly.
3. Such an agency could easily become a huge,
inefficient bureaucracy, with expenses so high that there
would be nothing left for developing countries. Any ineffici-
ency would also hinder resource development.
4. 1,2 and 3 above might well be especially
discriminatory against the interests of those developed
states extensively involved in marine activities.
5. The voting formula described in the Borgese
proposal would allow passage, in the "Maritime Assembly".
cf measures opposed v~>\/ fchs mriioritv of the direct repre-
sentatives of states or their governments. Such an Authority
might presume that it could undertake a policy divergent
from the strong desires of member states. Such a solution
would be unacceptable at this state in the development of
international relations, law and organization.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States proposal of an "International Trustee-
ship Zone" for a part of the sea-bed (as noted in Section II,
E) is an effort to reconcile the interests of domestic
minerals industries (in particular the petroleum industry)
as well as attract support from other coastal states with
significant continental margins. This proposal would grant
to coastal states effective, if not de facto
,
jurisdiction
over the exploitation of the resources of the entire con-
tinental margin, while affirming the status of the super-
adjacent waters as "High Seas". Following the above thesis,
this proposal appears undesirable for the following reasons
:
1. As long e.s <h« cess to the: sea-bed is through the super-
adjacent waters, there will be a natural tendency to
extend jurisdiction upward. This would follow the
classic pattern of a "special interest" zone being
converted to a "general interest" zone.
2. The proposal runs counter to the growing support
among other coastal states for one boundary between
national and international jurisdictions. Those
states with large coastal fishing interests and
little or no continental margin would not be deterred
from claiming wide territorial seas.
3. It would grant to coastal states one-third to one-
half of the potential revenue to be gained from the
exploitation of the continental margin. Those states
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having moderate to large continental margins would
benefit most. Since this area is the most promising
for both petroleum and other development in the fore-
seeable future, a large reduction in international
development funds otherwise accruing to the world
community would be the result.
4. Once a coastal state established its effective
jurisdiction over the "International Trusteeship
Zone" by leasing exploitive activities therein,
there is little doubt about what the final dis-
position of the area would be should the state
decide to withdraw from the regime.




_•< r*n i and ohvs ica 1 svstem Soli t retsoonsi-
bilities and resultant problems of coordination in
the "International Trusteeship Zone" would reduce
the degree of protection afforded the marine environ-
ment. Reconciling conflicting uses of ocean space
would be more complicated. Vertical continuity in
the marine environment precludes this type of
solution. More systematic cooperation in ocean
space, not less, is the basic requirement.
6. The stated interest of the petroleum industry in
advocating the expansion of national jurisdiction
over the resources of the entire continental margin
is based on fallacious reasoning. No less secure
source of energy could be found than offshore
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petroleum. In the event of conflict, a prime
target for an advisary possessing any naval power
at all would be the neat complex of oil rigs in the
Santa Barbara Channel or off the Texas-Louisiana
coast. More secure energy can be found in oil
shales within the continental limits. In addition,
a proposal which would recognize the jurisdiction
of other coastal states over "their" offshore
"international trust areas" would subject millions
of dollars of American investments, both present
and future, to expropriation by other governments.
For reasons of political simplicity and oceanographic
reality, a preferable solution would be the establishment
ef Cne -"**'*-* <"<r>1 1. .-m- -.-. ^- v--. r V">£a+-tAi<aior> fho nn+~"i ori^ 1 i 11 T" i sdj cti on
of coastal states and the "High Seas". In this regard,
there is no physical reason for prefering any one depth or
distance criterion from another. The distribution of marine
resources, however, and their effect on the interests of
states will be a deciding factor in this issue. Another
major factor will be the degree of involvement of individual
coastal states in oceanic activities.
This analysis indicates a majority of states would sup-
port relatively narrow limits of national jurisdiction if
combined with a strong regime governing the exploitation of
the sea-bed beyond. The term "relatively narrow" is used
because of the obvious need to satisfy, to some degree, the
interests of coastal states in the exploitation of living
90
V
and mineral resources off their shores. The following
delimitation, based on ideas obtained from Reference 113,
is suggested
:
1. A twelve-mile territorial sea, coupled with inter-
national guarantees of free passage through and
over international straits by aircraft and ships
on the surface.
2. A contiguous zone out to a water depth of 200 meters
or 50 miles from the baseline used to determine
the territorial sea, whichever is farthest seaward.
In this zone the coastal state would have:
a) jurisdiction over the exploitation of the mineral
resources of the sea-bed and its subsoil;
b) exclusive fisheries -jurisdiction subject to the
maintenance of historic fishing rights and non-
discrimination against any state in the granting
of licenses to foreign fishermen; (If desired, a
provision could be included whereby the coastal
state might "buy" the historic rights of other
states by payment of, for example, ten times the
current value of their catch.)
c) the right to full participation in, and access to,
the results of all scientific research;
d) limited jurisdiction for purposes of customs,
immigration and the control of pollution; (The
last to be subject to international regulations
for the control of pollution and not purely
arbitrary on the part of the coastal state.)
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e) the right of hot pursuit as guaranteed by Article
23 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas [Ref.
1.06] .
As indicated in Table I, the twelve-mile territorial
sea already has wide acceptance, only 13 of 1.12 states
presently claiming more. A contiguous zone out to a depth
of 200 meters or distance of 50 miles would represent a
compromise between the interests of coastal and land-locked
and shelf-limited states. The area of sea-bed removed from
the jurisdiction of an international regime would be less
than one-half that removed by a general 200 mile limit or a
regime under which coastal states acquired effective juris-
diction over the entire continental margin [Ref. 78, 117].
aTc^Q fnvnmhip +- n petroleum development would be included
under the international regime, thereby increasing potential
revenue for international development purposes.
The minimum area accruing to any coastal state for the
exploitation of marine resources off its coast would be 50
miles. This would be more equitable to those states with
little or no continental margin than a delimitation based
on depth alone. Since the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf established 200 meters as the minimum extent of shelf
accruing to the adjacent coastal state, those states whose
shelves reach a depth of 200 meters farther than 50 miles
from shore would oppose an attempt to retire the boundary to




Such a boundary delimitation would benefit developing
coastal states by allowing them ample room for the develop-
ment of domestic fisheries and for direct leasing of
minerals exploitation. Developed coastal countries would
benefit additionally from the narrow limit to the territorial
sea and uniform international regulations for the control of
ocean pollution. Distant water fishermen and oceanographic
research vessels would have more freedom than would be
possible under a general 200-mile territorial sea or would
likely result, in practice, from the national administration
of "international trust areas".
It is believed that such a proposal could achieve the
international support necessary for adoption at the 1973
Conference en the Law of the Sea. As previously stated,
however, the general acceptability of relatively narrow
limits to national jurisdiction is contingent upon the
establishment of a strong international regulatory regime
for the area beyond national limits. Based on this criterion,
the only regime which would satisfy political and economic
realities sufficiently to attract widespread support among
the nations is an International Ocean Authority of the
character depicted in Section VI B-2(c). Such a regime,
responsible to its member states, yet encompassing the
creditable technical competence and authority to coordinate
the rational development of all marine resources beyond
narrow limits of national jurisdiction, could yield great
benefits in the immediate future.

Opposition to such a solution on the grounds that it
constitutes a threat to national sovereignty is mistaken.
An International Authority would respect national sovereignty,
giving each nation a voice in the governance of ocean space
which it doesn't presently have. The true threat to national
sovereignty is the breakdown of the principle of "Freedom
of the Seas" which is an inevitable result of more intense
use of ocean space. Should the unimpeded expansion of
coastal state jurisdiction continue, incidents of conflict
between incompatible uses of the same space are bound to
increase. The best hope for replacing international tension
with international cooperation is a strong International
Authority providing a wide range of valuabje services.
p^^-c: that an International Authority of the tvpe
described would inevitably become an unwieldy bureaucracy
are unfounded. The incentive is to insure just the
opposite: a streamlined, efficient administration with
low operating costs which would not diminish funds available
for international development purposes. As previously
stated, the International Authority should coordinate and
plan research projects, leaving the execution and financing
to national and regional scientific groups. With regard to
operative responsibilities, such as pollution control and
the international data collection and prediction system,
maximum advantage should be taken of contractural arrange-




Establishing the limit of coastal state jurisdiction at
200 meters depth or 50 miles will preclude in the immediate
future any huge inflow of revenue from the exploitation of
petroleum and other shelf resources. This is not to say
that the Authority would face bankruptcy. Income from the
exploitation of such resources as manganese nodules is
likely to be available by the time the Authority is
operational. Nor are sea-bed minerals the only potential
source of funds. It is recommended that additional income
be obtained from a subscription fee for environmental fore-
casting services. Shipping companies, fishermen and national
governments, to name only a few, arc all potential users of
this valuable service. A nominal tax on the value of fish
and uu)^... living resources harvested beyond the Ii r-~i H~ = of
national jurisdiction is also recommended.
Turning to the subject of taxes and fees, care must be
exercised lest these be injudiciously high, especially in
the early stages of speculative ventures. They should be
structured to promote early development, with international
revenue a secondary objective. Such a policy would yield
much greater long term benefits. The requirement, in the
beginning, that a percentage of net income from sea-bed
exploitation be paid to the International Authority is
considered to be the most equitable solution.
Since international development funds are likely to be
limited at first, they should be used to promote ocean-
oriented activities, such as the development of fish protein
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concentrates, which could alleviate malnutrition. Rather
than penalize those states engaged in the exploitation of
sea-bed minerals by attempting to manipulate market prices,
special consideration for those states whose economies are
dependent on land derived minerals should take the form of
assistance toward greater economic diversification.
The United States has stimulated action on the inter-
national scene by advancing the most thorough proposal to
date for a sea-bed regime. As poinced out herein, however,
an imaginative sea-bed proposal standing alone is not an
adequate or acceptable response to the broad range of
problems currently plaguing the oceans. Only by a compre-
hensive approach can the true potential benefits to be
—dixCd fr~T. the marine Bv.vi r-nnmr^ri-f- hn realized. The United
States should seize the initiative now, accept a compromise
on national interests and assume a new policy of "moral
leadership" on this critical issue. By so doing, the country
may reap diplomatic as well as material benefits extending




Figure i - NORTH SEA
CONTINENTAL SHELF LITIGATION CHART
(Ref. 13)
Lines 1-2 and 1-3
Median lines reached by agreement
among Great Britain, Norway,
Den:::; i.
-..i .i. . \>.
Lines A-B and C-D
Partial boundary lines established
by agreements of 1 December 19G1
between Germany and the X >ther-
land and of. 9 June 1905 between
G< m my r>nd I) i mark.
Lines D-E and B- E
The equidistance linos at is:ue in
the case.
Line E-F
Proposed line dividing the claims
of Denmark and the Netherlands,
assuming the validity of lines D-E
and B-E.
Lines B-F and D-F
The boundary lines claimed by
Germany during its negotiations
with Denmark and the Netherlands.
•Reprinted, with modifications, from the derision of t!ie Court, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 13.
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Fipure 2i History of Domestic Offshore Activity (Ref, 19)
2000




Figure 3 : Estimated Rate of Extending Exploration nnd
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Figure 11 - ORGANIZATION OF THE OCEAN REGIME (Ref , ?7)
(merged Uorgcsc-Jacoby models)

















12 elected plus 5 representatives
of nations advanced tn oceanography
(See ARTICLE XII of DRAFT STATUTE)
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(Based on listing compiled by the Office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy
14 October 1970 and Reference 3)































STATES CLAIMING 4 NAUTICAL MILES - 4
Finland Norway
Iceland Sweden














STATES CLAIMING 10 NAUTICAL MILES - 1
Yugoslavia


















































Trinidad & Tobago Yemen
USSR Southern Yemen
STATES CLAIMING 20 KILOMETERS - 1
Lebanon
STATES CLAIMING IS NAUTICAL MILES
Cameroon
STATES CLAIMING 25 NAUTICAL MILES - 1
Gabon
STATES CLAIMING 130 NAUTICAL MILES - 1
Guinea









1. Philippines: Subscribes to Archipelago Theory - "Waters
within straight lines joining appropriate points of
outermost islands of the archipelago are considered
internal waters; waters between those baselines and
the limits described in the Treaty of Paris, December
10, 1898, the United States-Spain Treaty of November
7, 1900, and the United States-United Kingdom Treaty
of January 2, 1930, are considered to be the territorial
sea". (Office of JAGN)
.
# Indonesia: Subscribes to Archipelago Theory - Twelve
mile territorial sea measured seaward from straight
baselines connecting the outermost islands. (Office
of JAGN)
.
* Argentina: "By law of 29 December 1966, sovereignty was
claimed over a 200 mile zone, but freedom of navigation
of vessels and aircraft was not curtailed. It is not
clear whether or not this is a territorial sea claim in





Uruguay: "Law of 3 December 1959, claims a 200 mile
territorial sea, but specifically guarantees freedom
of navigation and overflight in the area beyond 12
miles." In the 12-200 mile portion of the territorial






























































SIZE - 41 (Less than 50,000 square nautical miles at










































STATES WITH LONG COASTS BUT LITTLE OR NO CONTINENTAL MARGINS - 3
Chile Ecuador Peru




STATES WITH LONG COASTS AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTINENTAL MARGINS






Canada Portugal (including dependencies)
China (Communist) South Africa
Cuba Thailand
Denmark (including Greenland) USSR












1 x.a ry Viet—Nam (
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